

N-13423.344-C

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGEForm Approved
OMB No. 074-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE 20 May 1964	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis August 1963 - May 1964	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE The Principal Leadership Problems Confronting The Chief Of A Military Assistance Advisory Group And Some Solutions For Selected Problems			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Smallwood, Grady L., Major, USA				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College 1 Reynolds Ave. Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)			10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES				
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A	
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 Words) For the past eighteen years the United States Government has spent millions of dollars annually for military assistance to numerous friendly nations. These vast expenditures for military assistance are directly attributable to the Communist drive for world domination which became apparent shortly after World War II. The importance of the military assistance program today is such that the United States Government places great reliance on it to halt Communist encroachment worldwide. As a consequence, the purpose of this paper is to present and appraise in the light of the present day cold war situation, some of the leadership problems confronting the chief of the principal field organization of the military assistance program, the military assistance advisory group (MAAG). Second, as a result of this appraisal, this study attempts to present solutions to some of the problems identified.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG); Military assistance Programs; Leadership			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 131	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT U	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE U	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT U	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT U	

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THE PRINCIPAL LEADERSHIP PROBLEMS CONFRONTING THE CHIEF
OF A MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP AND SOME
SOLUTIONS FOR SELECTED PROBLEMS

by

GRADY L. SMALLWOOD, Major, USA

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1964

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THE PRINCIPAL LEADERSHIP PROBLEMS CONFRONTING THE CHIEF
OF A MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP AND SOME
SOLUTIONS FOR SELECTED PROBLEMS

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements of the
degree of

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by
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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1964

U. S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE

(Thesis Approval Page)

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CONFRONTING THE CHIEF OF A MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP

AND SOME SOLUTIONS FOR SELECTED PROBLEMS

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Date 20 May 1964

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the individual student author and do not necessarily represent the views of either The United States Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. References to this study should include the foregoing statement.

PREFACE

For the past eighteen years the United States Government has spent millions of dollars annually for military assistance to numerous friendly nations. These vast expenditures for military assistance is directly attributable to the Communist drive for world domination which became apparent shortly after World War II. The importance of the military assistance program today is such that the United States Government places great reliance on it to halt Communist encroachment worldwide. As a consequence, the purpose of this paper is to present and appraise in the light of the present day cold war situation, some of the leadership problems confronting the chief of the principal field organization of the military assistance program, the military assistance advisory group (MAAG). Second, as a result of this appraisal, this study attempts to present solutions to some of the problems identified.

In achieving this purpose, Chapter I outlines the post World War II development of the military assistance program. The somewhat uncoordinated military aid program which was administered to the Philippine Republic, Greece, Turkey, China, Korea and Iran is discussed to illustrate how the program was originally conceived and the results attained. Chapter II outlines the functions of the MAAG Chief, the Unified Command Commander, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Secretaries and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) in the military assistance program. In Chapter III the duties and responsibilities of the U. S. Ambassador are examined. The relationship existing between the ambassador and

the MAAG Chief is presented. The role of the "country team" is analyzed and the MAAG Chief's responsibilities as a member of it are examined. In Chapter IV the strategic role of the MAAG Chief is examined in the light of the increasing importance of the military elite of the developing countries. Numerous examples are cited of the dominant role played by the military in Latin America, the Middle East, Southeast Asia and Africa. The importance of these military elites and the MAAG Chief's resultant responsibilities are emphasized. The failure of some MAAG Chiefs to grasp the board, strategic opportunities available to them as a result of their close relationship to the host country military is presented. In Chapter V the human relations problems which are encountered by the MAAG Chief and his subordinate advisors are discussed in relation to the question of how to achieve success. In addition the methods and techniques used by the advisors to accomplish their missions are examined in detail. Lastly, the quality of personnel assigned to MAAG's and the adequacy of their training is evaluated in the light of the importance of military assistance program effectiveness. This paper does not attempt to discuss the technical or logistical problems of the MAAG's because these problems are of such magnitude as to warrant separate treatment.

This paper assumes that the Communists will continue to use limited wars as a means of attaining world domination for the foreseeable future. This assumption indicates that the United States will continue to support the present system of MAAG's and military assistance missions as they exist today. Based on this assumption, it is felt that it is imperative that military assistance advisory operations be made more efficient and effective. The problem of security classification confronts all students who desire to conduct research in the military assistance program field. Much

useful information is deleted from congressional hearings and many useful field reports are not available except to the Unified Commands. However there is sufficient unclassified reports, studies and hearings to furnish ample basic material.

The most important documents used during this research were letters and field reports obtained from the Military Assistance Institute. The Composite Report of the President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program of 1959 constitute an extremely good source of basic material. The memorandum from Major General Lansdale, "Through Foreign Eyes," 1963, was found to be the most comprehensive work available concerning the practical aspects of military advisory techniques.

I wish to express my appreciation to the staff of the Military Assistance Institute for their valuable suggestions and I am particularly indebted to Col Frank J. Choinski, Director of Research, for his very helpful assistance. I also wish to express my sincere appreciation to Col Eber H. Thomas of the Command and General Staff College, my Research and Thesis Monitor, for his invaluable assistance in the writing of this thesis. Without his encouragement and helpful suggestions this paper would not have been possible. I wish to acknowledge Lt Col Thomas B. Maertens of the Command and General Staff College for his constructive criticisms and valuable assistance. I wish to express my appreciation to Lt Col Bruce C. Koch, Director of Graduate Studies, USACGSC, for his guidance and assistance. Many thanks are also due to Mr. Anthony F. McGraw and his fine staff of the Command and General Staff College Library who cheerfully assisted me in so many ways. I also wish to thank Colonel Francis W. O'Brien, Chief of Resident Instruction, of the Command and General Staff College for his confidence and support during this effort. Last, but not least, I wish to express gratitude to my wife, Suzie, whose patience and understanding made this study feasible.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The security of the United States today is based upon the concept of collective security. Our system of global alliances reflects the conviction that the security of the United States cannot be separated from that of the rest of the free world. If the free world can restrain the Communists from expanding their control over additional territory, then the national self-interest of the United States will be served. The leaders of our great nation realized shortly after World War II, that despite our wealth and resources the United States does not have the manpower, the material, or the money to "go it alone."¹

Even before the smouldering fires of World War II had died away, the Communists began their drive for world domination. The United States reacted to this threat by implementing military assistance and aid programs to five threatened countries between 1945 and 1949. This effort, though somewhat uncoordinated, proved to be extremely effective in countering the Communist menace.

The Philippine Republic became a target for the Communists during the early postwar years because of its strategic importance. The Communist-inspired Hukbalahapa (HUK) attacks soon caused conditions to

¹"Military Assistance: Backbone of Our Global Alliances", This Changing World (Armed Forces Information and Education, Department of Defense), April 2, 1962, p. 1.

deteriorate rapidly to a critical point in the young republic.² The United States responded quickly with the enactment of the Republic of the Philippines Military Assistance Act of 1946 which laid the foundation for the first of the postwar Military Assistance Programs. Under this act, The President was authorized, over a period of five years to provide for the instruction and training of Philippine nationals and to detail military and naval missions to the Philippine Islands; to maintain and repair military and naval equipment; and to transfer to the Philippine Government certain implements of war that could be released without impairing American naval and military requirements. The act was put into effect on 21 March 1947, by the President, in consideration of an agreement by the Philippine Government to allow the United States to use 23 army, naval and air force bases for a period of 99 years for mutual protection and the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. The Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 provided further assistance for strengthening the Philippine defenses.³

HUK adherence to the Communist cause was eventually shaken by the military as well as economic assistance rendered by the United States. Ultimately, the acceptance and implementation of the military and economic missions' recommendations proved instrumental in the subsequent collapse of the HUK movement.⁴

²"Information and Guidance", Military Assistance Program (7th ed. rev.; Washington, D.C.: Evaluation Division, Assistant for Mutual Security, Deputy Chief of Staff, S&L, Headquarters USAF, May 1963), p. 3.

³William Adams Brown, Jr. and Redvers Opie, American Foreign Assistance, (Menasha, Wisconsin: George Banta Publishing Co, 1953), p. 440.

⁴"Information and Guidance", Military Assistance Program, 1963, p. 3.

During these troubled postwar years, Soviet pressures were also being exerted against the sovereignty and independence of Greece and Turkey. The Soviet Union demanded control of the Dardanelles from Turkey. In Greece, communist guerillas supported by the Balkan satellite states, were trying to overthrow the government.⁵

In February of 1947, the United Kingdom, which had been supporting the Greek government against the Communist forces since the latter part of World War II, informed the United States that it would be forced to terminate its aid to Greece and Turkey because of serious financial problems at home. President Truman responded to the British plea by encouraging the U. S. Congress to act expeditiously on the request. \$654 million was expended under the Greek-Turkish Aid Program during the subsequent three year period.⁶ Thus, the second military assistance mission of the postwar years was established in the form of the Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group in Greece. (JUSMAPG)

Training and advisory activities were outstandingly significant in the Greek-Turkish program. Working in close cooperation with a British military mission, the Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group in Greece supervised the execution of education and training programs. In addition they supervised the training of Greek army units in the use of American weapons. In spite of the fact that statements made by the Administration implied that American personnel would not interfere at the operational level, from early in 1948 military advice was given down to the divisional level. It wasn't long

⁵"Military Assistance: Backbone of Our Global Alliances," This Changing World, 1962, p. 1.

⁶"Information and Guidance," Military Assistance Program, 1963, p. 3.

before officers of the JUSMAPG were accompanying Greek troops in combat operations and were giving advice on tactics at the battalion level. The Commanding General of JUSMAPG sat as a nonvoting member of the Greek Supreme National Defense Council. The Americans did not, however, actively participate in command or in combat operations. Initially, it was modestly estimated that between 10 and 40 members of the U. S. Armed Forces would be required. By 30 June 1940, the personnel strength of the military missions grew to 527 in Greece, and to 410 in Turkey. Due to the success of this Greek-Turkish military program, Greece did not capitulate and the security of Turkey was not actively threatened.⁷

The Military Assistance Program in Nationalist China was the third of the uncoordinated postwar assistance programs. Aid to China did not grow out of a single piece of legislation; it was more the cumulative growth of legislative and executive acts. While the naval assistance was authorized by separate legislation, military advice and training were continued under the wartime powers of the Executive. The funds were provided under the China Aid Act of 1948. At first, the United States had no clear-cut objective in China other than to assist in modernizing the Armed Forces in accordance with wartime commitments, and to restore internal order.⁸

Immediately after World War II, China received economic assistance for the relief of populations in war-torn areas largely through UNRRA, The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration⁷. The UNRRA mission to China remained active until 31 December 1947. Military assistance to

⁷ Brown and Opie, 443.

⁸ Ibid. 444.

China took the form mainly of transporting over 400,000 Nationalist troops by air and water to key sectors in eastern and northern China. The planning for this undertaking was accomplished by the headquarters of the United States Forces in the China theater. To supplement the operation, nearly 50,000 American marines were landed in North China where they occupied Peiping and Tientsin and took over railroads and coal mines to prevent the Communists from getting them.⁹

In December 1945, President Truman declared that a strong, united and democratic China was of utmost importance to world peace and order. As a result, various forms of military aid and assistance were given to China from 1946 through 1948. However, technical advice for the development of modern armed forces was not formally provided for until February 1946. Under his wartime powers the President authorized the secretaries of War and the Navy to establish jointly a Military Advisory Group in China. This group was not to exceed one thousand officers and men unless further authorized by the President. Pending congressional confirmation of the military section of the mission, which never took place, two groups were established. A formal agreement covering the missions was never entered into with the Chinese Government. A Joint United States Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG) was formally established in November 1948, shortly before all United States military personnel were withdrawn from China.¹⁰

The first U. S. Military Advisory Group in Korea was established there in 1889. This resulted from a treaty which the United States concluded with Korea in 1882. When this treaty of peace, amity, commerce and

⁹Ibid., 319.

¹⁰Ibid., 326

navigation was ratified in 1883, the Korean king asked the United States to send military advisors to train his army. Five years later the United States finally dispatched three officers as its first military advisory group to Korea. Needless to say, the long delay and the smallness of the mission did little at the time to sustain Korean confidence in the value of U. S. friendship.¹¹

Exactly sixty years later in 1948, the United States established another military mission in Korea to assist in training and equipping the internal security forces of the new republic. This time it was in accordance with a request of the United Nations Assembly that an American military mission continue to function in South Korea after the withdrawal of American troops was completed.¹²

To enable the infant Korean government to survive, the U. S. Government could not ignore the constant threat of riots and revolutionary activities inspired or abetted by the Communists. Also the existence in North Korea of an army of 125,000 men, trained and equipped by the Soviet Union prompted the U. S. Military Government to help organize and train security forces for the protection of Korea. Therefore, a Military Advisory Group remained in Korea to continue to render assistance. When the North Korean armies invaded South Korea on 25 June 1950, the U. S. Military Advisory Group personnel responded heroically to meet the red horde.¹³

¹¹Maj. Robert K. Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 4.

¹²Brown and Opie, pp. 444-445.

¹³Ibid., 380.

"The KMAG officers in Seoul remained with their Korean counterparts all day Sunday, watching an ominous picture develop on the situation maps. Advisors and Koreans alike were tense and excited. During the morning North Korean fighter planes strafed Seoul and Kimpo Airfield, and the last doubts that the attacks along the 38th Parallel were part of a major offensive vanished. Of particular concern to the members of the Advisory Group, now that the invasion had come, was the question of their mission. The terms of reference furnished a year earlier by the Department of the Army had not specified what KMAG's mission would be in the event of war".¹⁴ There were three alternatives that immediately came to mind: they could take up arms and actively help the South Koreans repel the invaders; they could advise the ROK Army in combat operations; or could leave Korea and abandon the republic to its fate. Even the U. S. Ambassador could not enlighten them on the proper course of action at the time. In the absence of precise guidance from Washington, Ambassador Muccio made preparations for evacuating American women and children to Japan. The North Korean invasion had produced a reawakening of U. S. interest in Korea and had set in motion a chain of events that dictated that KMAG remain as long as possible. As a result, KMAG remained to help build the South Korean Armed Forces into the largest, most modern non-communist force in Asia.¹⁵

Iran was the fifth nation to receive American military advisory personnel during the postwar years. Two American military missions were maintained in Iran throughout the postwar period. One mission of thirteen men, which operated under an agreement of 27 November 1943, had the

¹⁴Sawyer, 123.

¹⁵Ibid.

mission of assisting the Ministry of Interior to reform the gendarmerie into an elite corps of rural police that would be able to enforce the police powers of the Central Government throughout the rural and tribal areas of Persia.

The second American mission in Iran, operated under an agreement of 6 October 1947, effective until 20 March 1949, to assist in improving the efficiency of the army by advising and aiding in the formulation of plans. The Soviet Union sent notes of protest to Iran early in 1948 complaining about the presence of American missions in Iran. "The Iranian Government replied that the missions were not concerned with rearmament, mobilization, or secret operations of the general staff; that they had no hand in administering the army; and that the proposed purchase of arms from the United States was a question of economy, not alliance".¹⁶

Prior to 1949 the United States concentrated most of its efforts, at the time, on trying to persuade the United Nations Security Council to take action under the Charter in creating and making available to the United Nations national components of military forces for combating infractions of the peace. In line with this policy, the United States exercised stringent economic practices in its own military establishment. As a result, apart from the American military and naval missions to Latin American countries, military assistance was provided only to the five countries described above. This was as far as the United States went before 1949 in helping to build up military strength outside its own borders.

¹⁶Brown and Opie, 446.

The Soviet Union, during this period while posing as the foremost ostensible proponent of arms reduction, was rapidly building a formidable military establishment. By 1948 the United States realized that the system of collective security envisaged in the United Nations Charter was not to materialize for some time to come.¹⁷

With the ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 and the passage of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, the United States obligated itself to share with eleven other nations the responsibility for reciprocal military assistance based on mutually acceptable plans for collective military action.¹⁸

Responsibility for the effective use of the military assistance items was given to the Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG's). The MAAG's were to ascertain local needs; see that appropriate materials were properly requisitioned and received; provide the necessary training in making use of materials; and ensure that it was used to the best advantage for the purpose provided, and to see that the local programs were in harmony with the needs and capacities of the country.

In December 1949, the first military missions were announced. The personnel were dispatched to their posts immediately after the bilateral agreements were signed at the end of January 1950. From these original two hundred officers and men, selected for the new military missions the number of personnel involved in the military assistance program has increased to more than 5,000 personnel in more than forty countries.¹⁹

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid., 469

¹⁹ Ibid., 474

With the expansion of America's global alliances for progress and peace since World War II, it has become increasingly evident to the leaders of this nation that the attitudes of foreign groups, and particularly those of the uncommitted nations, can and do influence the degree of success we are able to achieve in the application of our foreign policy. It has been found that to an appreciable extent, and for better or for worse, foreigners will adjust their attitudes toward the United States to conform to the attitudes they develop toward our representatives as individuals.

Collectively, the Americans assigned to Military Assistance Advisory Groups represent a potentially powerful force for exerting a positive influence on the minds and attitudes of people in nearly every part of the world. If through their actions, U. S. MAAG personnel create an atmosphere of international ill will, the long range result can effectively impede the achievement of our cold war objectives. If on the other hand, a favorable and friendly U. S. image is created, the achievement of our cold war objectives will be facilitated.²⁰

One major area in which positive improvement can be made is that of "understanding." Our MAAG Chiefs and the advisors working for them must have the sincere desire to want to understand the geography, the people, the customs and the language of their host country. Every effort must be made to isolate and define the many problems inherent to their tasks - many of which may be sensitive and delicate to handle. These problems must be carefully analyzed in an effort to obtain practical and workable solutions.

²⁰Col Richard C. Harris, "Overseasmanship", (in the files of the Military Assistance Institute, Washington, D. C.), p. 2.

Since every problem which challenges a subordinate advisor is of direct concern and interest to the MAAG Chief, he must exert all of his imaginative and creative resources to provide the necessary leadership.

However, before we attempt to identify and arrive at solutions to some of these leadership problems we shall first examine the duties and responsibilities of the MAAG Chief as well as the functions he performs and the roles which he and his subordinates are required to play.


CHAPTER II

THE FUNCTIONS OF THE MAAG CHIEF AND THE MILITARY CHAIN OF COMMAND

In order to intelligently analyze the leadership problems confronting the MAAG Chief, it is first necessary to clearly understand the functions assigned to him and further, to be aware of the controls, authority, and direction given him by the United States Department of Defense.

The MAAG Chief is a commander. This must be clearly understood at the beginning. As a commander, the MAAG Chief has two "masters." The commander of the U. S. Unified Command is the "military master" and the U. S. Ambassador to the host country is the "diplomatic master". This chapter will be confined largely to a consideration of the relationship between the MAAG Chief and his "military master." A subsequent chapter will deal more thoroughly with the relationship existing between the MAAG Chief and the U. S. Ambassador. However, as a preliminary introduction to the somewhat unique position occupied by the MAAG Chief concerning the "two master" concept, it is felt that a brief description of the various relationships involved will facilitate a better appreciation of the subject.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM EXECUTIVE BRANCH ORGANIZATION



— DIRECTION

- - - COORDINATION

== THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE OPERATES WITHIN THE FOREIGN AND FISCAL POLICY GUIDELINES LAID DOWN BY THE SECRETARIES OF STATE AND TREASURY, RESPECTIVELY.

In the military chain of command we find that "the Chief of the MAAG is the representative of the Secretary of Defense with the host government to which the MAAG is accredited. He serves under the military command of the Commander of the Unified Command to which his MAAG is assigned. . .".¹

In regard to the U. S. Ambassador the Department of Defense states that "the Chief of the MAAG is under the supervision of the Chief of the U. S. Diplomatic Mission to the extent provided by law and in accordance with Executive Orders and such other instructions as the President may from time to time promulgate.. As Chief of a separate element of the U. S. Diplomatic Mission, he will coordinate MAAG activities with the other U. S. governmental agencies represented in the U. S. Diplomatic Mission which are concerned with the execution of Foreign Assistance legislation. The Chief of The MAAG will cooperate with the Chief of the U. S. Diplomatic Mission and will assure that the Chief of the U. S. Diplomatic Mission is kept fully informed concerning current and prospective military assistance plans and programs and MAAG activities. The Chief of the MAAG shall have direct access to the Chief of the U. S. Diplomatic Mission. Unresolved differences between the Chief of the U. S. Diplomatic Mission and the Chief of the MAAG will be referred to the Secretary of Defense through the Commander of the Unified Command concerned. . .".²

¹ U. S., Department of Defense, Department of Defense Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Military Assistance, Department of Defense Directive No 5132.3, July 8, 1963, p. 11.

² Ibid.

The MAAG Chief

The Department of Defense has directed that the Chiefs of MAAG will perform the following functions:

Represent the Department of Defense with the government to which they are accredited, maintain the U. S. military presence, and establish a relationship of mutual trust and confidence with the Ministry of Defense and the armed forces of that country.

Make recommendations concerning military assistance in their respective countries to the Commander of the Unified Command concerned.

Develop military assistance plans and programs in cooperation with the Chief of the U. S. Diplomatic Mission and other elements of the Country Team and submit them to the Commander of the Unified Command concerned.

Observe and report on the utilization of materiel furnished by and personnel trained by the U. S.

When directed by appropriate authority, cooperate with representatives of specified U. S. firms in furthering sales of U. S.-produced military equipment to meet valid country requirements.

Provide appropriate advisory services and technical assistance to recipient countries on military assistance, including training assistance and military assistance purchases.

Work directly with the Military Departments and appropriate military area commands in arranging for receipt and transfer of military assistance material, training, and services to recipient nations.

Provide liaison with the country involved with respect of weapons production and residual offshore procurement matters.

With regard to the host countries' implementation of that portion of its military program financed by other U. S. agencies and U. S.-owned local currency, develop and execute a program of review and observation to serve as a basis for rendering an appropriate report to the Chief of the U. S. Diplomatic Mission and the Chief, U. S. Agency for International Development Mission.

When appropriate, act as channel of communication for the DDR&E /Director of Defense Research and Engineering/ (and the DEFREPNAME /Defense Representative, North Atlantic and Mediterranean Areas/ as appropriate) keeping Unified Commands informed, regarding research and development matters between the U. S. and the government to which they are accredited. Act as channel of communication for the ASD (I&L) /Installations and Logistics/ and the DEFREPNAME regarding production and other logistic matters between the U. S. and the government to which they are accredited.³

Provide the point of contact for the exchange of information on forces, budgets, weapons and capabilities as required. . .

Assist Commanders of Unified Commands (and the DEFREPNAME as appropriate) in planning for possible U. S. support of country wartime logistic requirements.

Provide liaison with the country to which accredited with respect to any other military assistance requirements or logistics matters of the DOD and perform such other functions as may be required under Foreign Assistance legislations.⁴

The DOD directive specifies that in "discharging these functions, the Chief of the MAAG will be guided by the policies and procedures set forth in the Military Assistance Manual, applicable DOD Directives and Instructions, and such other directive as may be issued from time to time by appropriate authority."⁵

³ The Defense Representative, North Atlantic and Mediterranean Areas (DEFREPNAME) is the principal civilian representative of the Secretary of Defense in Europe, the Middle East, (including Saudi Arabia and Pakistan), and North Africa who plans, recommends and monitors certain aspects of military assistance participation. Ibid., p. 7.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 12-13.

⁵ Ibid., p. 13.

The MAAG Chief is permitted to authorize direct "communication between Service sections of the MAAGs and their respective Military Departments on technical and administrative matters."⁶

Terms of Reference

The MAAG Chief receives further guidance from another document called "Terms of Reference." This is the basic document of the MAAG. It is based on the agreement between the United States Government and the government of the host country. The MAAG Chief looks to this document to find out exactly what his MAAG may or may not do. The "Terms of Reference" while standard in format must of necessity vary in scope and content in each individual MAAG, dependent on the specific missions assigned. This document may be revised as the need arises by the next higher military headquarters and by joint Defense-State Department directives. Executive orders issued by the President of the United States which apply to MAAG operations will also be included in the "Terms of Reference".

The Chief MAAG uses the "Terms of Reference" as his basic directive, plus any additional instructions that he has received from the next higher military headquarters and from the United States Ambassador to establish the MAAG policy. The "Terms of Reference" include the primary mission of the MAAG, its composition and size, the relationship between MAAG and the other United States agencies in the

⁶ Ibid.

host country and the responsibilities of the MAAG Chief. The MAAG policy will be influenced by the MAAG Chief's own personality and by the conditions in the host country. The MAAG Chief, as a commander, must make his policy unmistakably clear to all members of the MAAG at all times and must inform all concerned when the policy changes in any respect.⁷ The standard format and content for the "Terms of Reference" is included as Appendix A.

The Unified Command Commander

The immediate military commander of the MAAG Chief is the United States commander of the Unified Command. The Department of Defense has directed that with respect to military assistance within their respective areas of responsibility the Commanders of Unified Commands shall:

Correlate military assistance plans and programs with U. S. military plans.

Supervise and direct the development, execution and updating of recommended plans and programs in accordance with the Military Assistance Manual and other pertinent instructions provided by the ASD(ISA) [Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)]

Under the direction of the ASD(ISA), present and justify military assistance plans and programs for their areas of responsibility at all review levels, including, if required, justification before the Congress.

Direct and supervise submission of budget data for administrative support programs as required by the Military Departments.

⁷ Lt General S. T. Williams, USA(Ret), "The Practical Demands of MAAG", The MAP Advisor (Washington: The Military Assistance Institute, 1963), p. 88.

Command and supervise the activities of the MAAGs in their respective areas, and provide necessary technical assistance and administrative support.

Provide guidance to MAAGs with respect to encouragement and promotion of sales of U. S.-produced military equipment directed toward attainment of valid military requirements.

Draw upon the technical advice and assistance of component and specified U. S. military commands in their area, and of the U. S. elements within international military commands in their area in the development and execution of long-range area plans and programs of Military assistance, including MAS/Military Assistance Sales.

Coordinate residual offshore procurement activities carried out by their respective subordinate procuring agencies, including coordination with the Chief of the U. S. Diplomatic Mission in the country concerned.

Be responsible for periodic review and evaluation of the actions taken by the MAAGs in connection with the review and observation of host countries' implementation of that portion of its military program financed by other U. S. agencies with U. S.-owned local currency.

Make recommendations as appropriate to the DEFREPNAME, the ASD(ISA), ASD(I&L) or the DDR&E regarding programs which are the responsibility of those organizations, including NATO infrastructure, the Weapons Production Program, and the Mutual Weapons Development Program. These recommendations should include advice regarding the extent to which categories of equipment might be developed, produced or modernized abroad, and the provision of technical assistance in the study of proposed projects and execution of approved programs.

In accordance with guidance and direction of the Secretary of Defense, direct and supervise the execution of approved programs in the respective areas and provide such other assistance as may be requested in connection with military assistance, including MAS.

In the development of military assistance plans and programs, obtain and consider recommendations of other affected unified and specified commands.⁸

⁸ U. S., Dept. of Defense Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Military Assistance, 1963, pp. 9-10.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, while not in the command chain as such, provide military advice to the Secretary of Defense on military assistance matters and thereby influence MAAG operations and policy indirectly. The Department of Defense has directed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in accordance with their statutory responsibility, shall provide the Secretary of Defense with military advice on military assistance matters, including (but not limited to) the following:

Recommending military force objectives for allies or potential allies, general strategic priorities, missions, tasks, and requirements for force development on a country and area basis.

Monitoring the planning for an execution of military assistance to ensure that it is in consonance with approved U. S. strategic concepts and plans.

Recommending priorities of allocation of military materiel and equipment among recipient nations and between recipient nations and the U. S. Armed Forces.

Making recommendations concerning MAP dollar allocations and reallocations by country, region, and world-wide, during all phases of military assistance planning and programming.

Making recommendations concerning the selection, introduction, redistribution, and/or standardization of weapons systems for military assistance recipients.

Reviewing and commenting on appropriate portions of the Military Assistance Manual and other guidance prior to approval.

Reviewing and commenting upon military assistance plans and programs submitted to the ASD(ISA) by the Commanders of Unified Commands.

Recommending to the Secretary of Defense for approval of terms of reference for MAAG Chiefs and military assistance organizational and military assistance manpower requirements for MAAGs under unified commands which are supported by military assistance appropriations.

Recommending to the Secretary of Defense for approval the designation of Services responsible to furnish MAAG Chiefs.

Recommending to the Secretary of Defense for approval the nomination of positions as Chiefs of MAAG's based on recommendations by the Military Departments.

Conducting broad evaluations of the effectiveness of military assistance from the military viewpoint in achieving its objectives on a regional, treaty organization and country basis.⁹

The Secretaries of the Military Departments

The Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force are also involved in military assistance activities. They have been directed to accomplish the following:

Provide data pertaining to price, source, availability and lead time for use in developing and reviewing programs as requested by ASD(ISA).

Provide estimates of funding requirements, provide technical advice, and recommend changes where appropriate.

Procure and deliver to recipients materiel and services included in approved programs in accordance with delivery schedules approved by the ASD(ISA).

Establish jointly with the ASD(ISA) all necessary procedures for follow-up, expediting and other related actions for MAP orders and MAS agreements.

Provide technical assistance and facilities and furnish advice and recommendations, as requested by the ASD(ISA) and the DDR&E, with respect to international programs of research and development, and as requested by ASD(ISA) and ASD(I&L) with respect to production and logistics.

With the approval of the ASD(ISA), sell military equipment and services to eligible nations and international organizations in accordance with the Act. The ASD(ISA) may authorize the Military Departments without specific prior approval to make sales to certain nations and organizations, or with respect to certain categories of materiel.

⁹ Ibid., pp. 7-8.

Coordinate and supervise relations of DDO organizations with other governmental agencies in the field of military assistance.

In coordination with other agencies, formulate guidance for preparation of long-range military assistance plans and programs.

Supervise military assistance planning, programming, budgeting, and implementation, including the development, preparation, refinement and control of plans and programs; the establishment of the monetary value thereof; approval and control of delivery schedules; and prompt funding to the implementing agencies.

Establish jointly with the recipient DOD component all necessary procedures for follow-up, expediting and other related actions for MAP orders and MAS agreements.

Obtain JCS comment and recommendations on the aforementioned which involve the establishment of the monetary value, development, preparation, refinement, and control of plans and programs and which fall within their assigned responsibility to insure that the Military Assistance Program does support and is in consonance with U. S. Military strategic plans and objectives.

Prepare and support before the Congress the annual request for military assistance legislation and funds, in conjunction with other agencies and offices of the DOD, as appropriate.

Review and approve recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff pertaining to terms of reference for MAAG Chiefs, and to military assistance organizational and military assistance manpower requirements for MAAGs under unified commands which are supported by military assistance appropriations.

Approve on behalf of the Secretary of Defense the appointment of Chiefs of MAAGs, nominated by the JCS based on recommendations by the Military Departments.

Review and approve recommendations of the JCS pertaining to the Service designation of the MAAG Chiefs.

Provide policy guidance, as appropriate, to DOD representatives on U. S. missions and to international organizations and conferences.

Conduct broad evaluations of the effectiveness of military assistance from the policy and planning viewpoint in achieving its objectives on a regional, treaty organization, and country basis.

Integrate procurement for military assistance programs with Service procurement programs in accordance with policy guidance provided by ASD(I&L).

Maintain appropriate records and furnish necessary reports within the scope of their responsibility.

Assure that information with respect to purchases proposed to be made for military assistance and sales programs is made available, as far in advance as possible, to suppliers in the U. S. and, particularly, to small independent enterprises in accordance with Section 602 of the Act.

Provide the ASD(ISA), ASD(I&L), Unified Commands, and the MAAGs, as appropriate, with technical military advice as to weapons systems, tactics and doctrine, and pertinent information relating to logistic support.

Obtain from the Unified Commands and MAAGs, as appropriate, such data and information as may be required to carry out the assigned responsibilities.

With respect to the area or areas assigned, be responsible for providing administrative support needed to carry out military assistance functions, subject to the direction and policy guidance of the ASD(ISA).¹⁰

The Assistant Secretary of Defense
(International Security Affairs)

The individual who is responsible for all military assistance activities of the Department of Defense and who acts for the Secretary of Defense in military assistance matters is the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs). In carrying out this responsibility, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) is charged with accomplishing the following:

Direct, administer, and supervise the military assistance programs.

Direct, administer and supervise Military Assistance Sales (MAS).

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 6-7.

Maintain records and issue reports as required for the management of military assistance.

In conjunction with other agencies, maintain liaison with other countries which are planning military assistance to third countries in order to avoid duplication of effort and achieve maximum mutual effectiveness of programs.

Make full use of established facilities in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments, the JCS, and other DOD components.¹¹

Relationships

In summary, we find that the channel of communication with Unified Commands on matters relating to military assistance is directly between those Commands and the Secretary of Defense. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) has staff responsibility for military assistance matters and is authorized to communicate directly with Commanders of Unified Commands concerning such matters. All Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) directives and communications to Unified Commands, the Military Departments, or the MAAG's, which pertain to military assistance affairs and have strategic or military operational implications are coordinated with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Conversely, all JCS directives and communications to the Unified and Specified Commands, the Military Departments, or the MAAGs, which pertain to military assistance affairs, are required to be coordinated with the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA).¹²

Lieutenant General Samuel T. Williams, USA (Ret), who was Chief of MAAG in Vietnam from 1955 to 1960, sums up the MAAG's relationship to the Unified Command as follows:

¹¹Ibid., pp. 4-5.

¹²Ibid., p. 14.

The relationship between MAAG and the next higher headquarters should be exactly as that between any other two military headquarters. The higher headquarters should lay down directives and guidelines and they should be followed to the letter.¹³

He also states that "at the same time, MAAG should give to the higher headquarters the benefit of its on-the-spot observations and recommendations."¹⁴

The evidence compiled during this endeavor indicates that the U. S. Military chain of command poses no unusual leadership problems for the MAAG Chief. As indicated by General Williams' remarks above, it is a normal command arrangement from the viewpoint of the MAAG Chief.

It is felt, however, that the general background information presented in the foregoing material is essential to an understanding of MAAG operations. If it has helped to dispel some of the mystery surrounding the MAAG chain of command and clarified the duties and responsibilities of the individuals involved, it has achieved its purpose.

¹³Williams, p. 90.

¹⁴Ibid.

CHAPTER III

THE MAAG CHIEF, THE AMBASSADOR AND THE COUNTRY TEAM

The American ambassador is the senior American representative in the foreign country where he is stationed. As such, he outranks all other Americans, no matter what their service or rank in their own field. In fact, he is senior to all Americans, who should come to visit, while at his post, with the exception of the President of the United States. He is therefore, theoretically senior in rank to the Vice President, the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense when they visit the country. However, it is very unlikely that a wise ambassador would insist on preceding these distinguished guests on the protocol list.¹

The ambassador holds this exalted rank for several reasons. One is that long-established diplomatic practice has accustomed nations and governments to accept the ambassador in that capacity. The practice of diplomacy over the centuries established the idea that an ambassador was not merely an intermediary or link between two rulers. He was the alter ego of his sovereign and entitled to

¹ Hon. John D. Jernegan, "The Role of the Ambassador and the Country Team," Paper prepared while Ambassador Jernegan was State Department Advisor to the Commander of Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, p. 77.

all the respect and privileges that his sovereign would have been given in person.²

Today this idea has lost some of its meaning, but it is still honored to a significant extent. The important thing is that the ambassador is the only senior official in a foreign country who represents the whole of the United States government. He not only represents the President and the Secretary of State, but also each and every agency of the United States.³

The ambassador is the individual to whom the host country looks for information on the policy, actions, and attitudes of the American government. It is the ambassador to whom the host country conveys its own views, requests, and complaints.

The United States Government holds him responsible for accurately reporting events, conveying its messages, and dealing with any problems that arise.⁴

The Country Team

As the ranking American official the ambassador heads a group of U. S. agencies which are known as the country team. One definition of the country team is: "Whatever group of United States Government officers a particular American ambassador chooses to select to assist him in meeting his responsibilities to coordinate official American activities in his country of assignment."⁵ However,

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid., p. 78.

⁵ Ibid., p. 81.

the country team is not mentioned by name in any legal document and has no legal standing, nor are its composition or functions laid down anywhere in a formal document. It is an expedient term of reference used informally to identify the ambassador and his heterogenous collection of U. S. helpers.

The need for an organization of this nature became increasingly apparent shortly after World War II. Our economic and aid programs to Greece in 1947 illustrated a pressing need for coordination among U. S. agencies in that strife torn country rather vividly. During 1947 and 1948 the United States had three separate and independent missions in Greece: The Diplomatic Mission, the Military Mission and the Economic Aid Mission. Each mission was headed by a very senior, very distinguished man with each going his own merry way. The seniority of the ambassador was recognized only on paper and then usually only by the State Department. The result of this situation was that there was no coordination at all by the mission chiefs involved. At times, the ambassador was trying to strengthen the political group which was running the government, while the chief of the Economic Aid Mission was doing his best to help the party in opposition. This type of confusion gradually produced a realization that something had to be done to pull things together. The first formal result was a memorandum of understanding of 15 February 1951 between the State Department, the Defense Department and the forerunner of today's Agency for International Development, the Economic Cooperation Administration. This memorandum provided for the formation of a team of U. S. representatives at the country level under the leadership of the ambassador for the purpose of coordinating all

programs of the three agencies in the country concerned. This was followed by provisions in the Mutual Security Legislation of 1951 and 1954 requiring that the administration of economic and military aid should be coordinated with our foreign policy.⁶

Executive Order 10575

President Eisenhower, in Executive Order 10575, 6 November 1954, spelled out the functions of the ambassador in Sec 201 which are quoted below:

Functions of the Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission:

(a) The Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission in each country, as the representative of the President, shall serve as the channel of authority on foreign policy and shall provide foreign policy direction to all representatives of United States agencies in such country.

(b) The Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission in each country, as the representative of the President and acting on his behalf, shall coordinate the activities of the representatives of United States agencies (including the chiefs of economic and technical assistance missions, military assistance advisory groups, foreign information staffs, and other representatives of agencies of the United States Government) in such country engaged in carrying out programs under the Act, programs under the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, and the programs transferred by section 2 of Reorganization Plan No. 8 of 1953 (67 Stat. 642); and he shall assume responsibility for assuring the unified development and execution of the said programs in such country. More particularly, the functions of each chief of United States Diplomatic Mission shall include, with respect to the programs and the country concerned, the functions of:

(1) Exercising general direction and leadership of the entire effort.

(2) Assuring that recommendations and prospective plans and actions of representatives of United States agencies are effectively coordinated and are consistent with, and in furtherance of, the established policy of the United States.

⁶ Ibid., pp. 81-82.

(3) Assuring that the interpretation and application of instructions received by representatives of United States agencies from higher authority are in accord with the established policy of the United States.

(4) Guiding the representatives of United States agencies in working out measures to prevent duplication in their efforts and to promote the most effective and efficient use of all United States officers and employees engaged in work on the said programs.

(5) Keeping the representatives of United States agencies fully informed as to current and prospective United States policies.

(6) Prescribing procedures governing the coordination of the activities of representatives of United States agencies, and assuring that such representatives shall have access to all available information essential to the accomplishment of their prescribed duties.

(7) Preparing and submitting such reports on the operation and status of the programs referred to in the introductory portion of this subsection as may be requested of the Secretary of State by the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration, or the Director of the United States Information Agency, with respect to their respective responsibilities.

(8) Recommending the withdrawal of United States personnel from the country whenever in his opinion the interests of the United States warrants such action.

(c) Each Chief of United States Diplomatic Mission shall perform his functions under this part in accordance with instructions from higher authority and subject to established policies and programs of the United States. Only the President and the Secretary of State shall communicate instructions directly to the Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission.

(d) No Chief of United States Diplomatic Mission shall delegate any function conferred upon him by the provisions of this Part which directly involves the exercise of direction, coordination, or authority."⁷

This same act also took a realistic view in the consideration of differences of opinion which might arise between the ambassador and the heads of the other U. S. agencies. Sec 202, which is quoted

⁷ U. S., President, 1953-1961 (Eisenhower), Administration of Foreign Aid Functions: Executive Order 10575, Nov. 6, 1954, Department of the Army Bulletin Number 12 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1954), p.

below, allowed the issue in question to be referred to a higher level.

Referral of unresolved matters. The Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission in each country shall initiate steps to reconcile any divergent views arising between representatives of United States agencies in the country concerned with respect to programs referred to in the introductory portion of section 201(b) of this order. If agreement cannot be reached, the Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission shall recommend a course of action, and such course of action shall be followed unless a representative of a United States agency requests that the issue be referred to the Secretary of State and the United States agencies concerned for decision. If such a request is made, the parties concerned shall promptly refer the issue for resolution prior to taking action at the country level.⁸

In order to further avoid the confusion and lack of teamwork which occurred in 1947 and 1948, Executive Order 10575 again stressed the requirement for full coordination and interchange of information in Sec 203 as follows:

Further coordination procedures and relationships.
 (a) All representatives of United States agencies in each country shall be subject to the responsibilities imposed upon the Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission in such country by section 523(b) of the act and by this part.
 (b) Subject to compliance with the provisions of this part and with the prescribed procedures of their respective agencies, all representatives of United States agencies affected by this part (1) shall have direct communication with their respective agencies and with such other parties and in such manner as may be authorized by their respective agencies, (2) shall keep the respective Chiefs of United States Diplomatic Missions and each other fully and currently informed on all matters, including prospective plans, recommendations, and actions relating to the programs referred to in the introductory portion of Sec 201(b) of this order, and (3) shall furnish to the respective Chiefs of United States Diplomatic Missions, upon their request, documents and information concerning the said programs.⁹

⁸ Ibid., p.

⁹ Ibid., p.

Executive Order 10893

On 8 November 1960, the President issued Executive Order No. 10893. This executive order superseded Executive Order No. 10575 of 9 November 1954. Sec 201 of the executive order is particularly pertinent to the country team concept. It provides for the following:

Functions of Chiefs of United States Diplomatic Missions. The several Chiefs of the United States Diplomatic Missions in Foreign countries, as the representatives of the President and acting on his behalf, shall have and exercise, to the extent permitted by law and in accordance with such instructions as the President may from time to time promulgate, affirmative responsibility for the coordination and supervision over the carrying out by agencies of their functions in the respective countries.¹⁰

On the same date the President signed a memorandum which was later published in the Federal Register. It was addressed to the heads of all executive departments and agencies directing particular attention to Section 201 of Executive Order No. 10893. The President emphasized that coordination and supervision of United States activities in foreign countries is a most vital aspect of the conduct of foreign affairs. It stated:

It is my desire that all appropriate steps be taken to assure that the Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission is effective in discharging his role as the representative of the President. Therefore, I am instructing that, to the extent permitted by law and within the framework of established policies and programs of the United States, the Chief of Mission shall have and exercise affirmative responsibility for the coordination and supervision of all United States activities in the country to which he is accredited. It is expected that particular emphasis will be given to the following in the

¹⁰U. S., President, 1953-1961 (Eisenhower), Administration of Mutual Security and Related Functions: Executive Order 10893, Nov. 8, 1960, Federal Register Document 60, (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 10584.

exercise of this authority: (1) the Chief of Mission will take affirmative responsibility for the development, coordination, and administration of diplomatic, informational, educational and trade activities and programs; economic, technical and financial assistance; military assistance; and the disposal of surplus agricultural commodities abroad (2) the Chief of Mission will assure compliance with standards established by higher authority, and will recommend appropriate changes in such standards and suggest desirable new standards and suggest desirable new standards, governing the personal conduct and the level of services and privileges accorded all United States civilian and military personnel stationed in the foreign country and report to the President upon adherence to such standards, and (3) the Chief of Mission will establish procedures so that he is kept informed of United States activities in the country. He will report promptly to the President as to any matter which he considers to need correction and with respect to which he is not empowered to effect correction.¹¹

President Kennedy expressed his views on the importance of the ambassador in the coordination problem in a letter to all Chiefs of Mission on 29 May 1961. In this letter the President reiterated the ambassador's authority to direct the removal from the host country of members of the mission not functioning effectively.

You are in charge of the entire United States Diplomatic Mission, and I shall expect you to supervise all of its operations. The mission includes not only the personnel of the Department of State and the Foreign Service, but also the representatives of all other United States agencies which have programs or activities in. . . . I shall give you full support and backing in carrying out your assignment.

¹¹Ibid.

Needless to say, the representatives of other agencies are expected to communicate directly with their offices here in Washington, and in the event of a decision by you in which they do not concur, they may ask to have the decision reviewed by a higher authority in Washington.

However, it is their responsibility to keep you fully informed of their views and activities and to abide by your decisions unless in some particular instance you and they are notified to the contrary.

If in your judgment, individual members of the Mission are not functioning effectively, you should take whatever action you feel may be required, reporting the circumstances, of course, to the Department of State.

In case the departure from . . . of any individual member of the Mission is indicated in your judgment, I shall expect you to make the decision and see that it is carried into effect. Such instances I am confident, will be rare.¹²

Exception to Ambassador's Authority

In this letter of 29 May 1961, the President pointed out one exception to the ambassador's authority in relation to the military.

Now one word about your relations to the military. As you know, the United States Diplomatic Mission includes Service Attaches, Military Assistance Advisory Groups and other Military components attached to the Mission. It does not, however, include United States military forces operating in the field where such forces are under the command of a United States area military commander. The line of authority to these forces runs from me, to the Secretary of Defense, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington and to the area commander in the field.

¹²Letter from President John F. Kennedy to Chiefs of Mission, May 29, 1961, Document Number 24, p. 2.

Although this means that, the chief of the American Diplomatic Mission is not in the line of military command, nevertheless, as Chief of Mission, you should work closely with the appropriate area military commander to assure the full exchange of information. If it is your opinion that activities by the United States military forces may adversely affect our overall relations with the people or government of. . . you should promptly discuss the matter with the military commander, and if necessary, request a decision by higher authority.¹³

The ambassador cannot give order to the operating commander, but he is instructed to assure that effective liaison is established in order to insure that our military and diplomatic actions are mutually reinforcing.

Since the MAAG Chief is often the senior US military representative present in many countries, he must be aware of the necessity of giving full support to the ambassador when military and political emergencies arise. While the MAAG Chief would not normally be given command of a U S. military expeditionary force entering the host country, he might be called on for support, coordination or advice by such a commander. If such a situation did arise, the MAAG Chief might be able to render invaluable service in numerous ways. Coordination between the ambassador and the force commander would be paramount in importance.

The Lebanon Crisis

For example, in the Lebanon crisis, the marine battalion landed and "while the landing operation proceeded with military

¹³Ibid., pp. 2-3

precision, politically it left something to be desired. Though careful to brief the marines, the Navy either carelessly or deliberately had failed to brief the ambassador."¹⁴ The ambassador, apprehensive of a clash with the Lebanese forces, wanted to delay the marines until the Lebanese troops could be quieted down. The Lebanese troops, it seems, had tanks already deployed and were prepared to open fire if the marines advanced into the city. To avoid a clash which might not only cause fatal casualties but also spark a major conflict in the Middle East, the ambassador sent word to the senior officer present, a naval captain, suggesting he come to the embassy at once. "A polite but terse message came back that the captain would be glad to receive the ambassador on his ship and would send a helicopter for him."¹⁵ The ambassador had no desire "to go spinning out to sea in a helicopter leaving his staff in perhaps the tensest situation he had encountered in his long career."¹⁶ The ambassador "repeated his invitation to the captain in somewhat more forceful terms, explaining that his business was not social but had the gravest political implications. The captain replied that his orders were clear and to the effect that the Marines would march into the city next morning. Until then he was staying on his ship."¹⁷

This incident illustrates what can happen when American military leaders hold to the doctrine that "the primary objective of

¹⁴Charles W. Thayer, Diplomat, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959), p. 31.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 32.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Ibid.

war is military victory. After that has been accomplished the diplomats can pick up the pieces and do whatever they please with them. But while military operations are taking place diplomats should get out of the way lest they get run over by a soldier in a tank or a general in a staff car."¹⁸ This confusion in Lebanon apparently resulted from the failure of the Sixth Fleet to maintain its radio-telephone link with the embassy and the failure to keep the ambassador informed of the place of the landings. "Later, when questioned about these lapses by a journalist, the Navy's reaction was a frigid silence."¹⁹ Happily, the next day, the ambassador and the marine landing force commander cooperated in the operation and averted the impending clash between the marines and the Lebanese forces.²⁰

The authority given the Chief of the Mission in Executive Order No. 10893, enables him to conduct an effective Country Team operation. This concept provides a forum for passing information to all the U. S. agencies in a country; an opportunity for exchange of viewpoints on common problems affecting the U. S. agencies; a place for resolution of minor differences or misunderstandings; and an appropriate assembly where the ambassador may concur in positions and policies that affect the U. S. military and civilian personnel in that particular country.²¹

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Ibid., pp. 32-33.

²⁰Ibid., pp. 33-36.

²¹Jernegan, p. 88.

MAAG Chief's Responsibilities

Basically the Country Team's purpose is to pool knowledge and ideas and to promote a spirit of complete cooperation. During the research project, the evidence collected indicates that the ambassador's role as the head of the country team is well understood and accepted by the MAAG Chiefs. The relationships between the MAAG Chief, the ambassador and the chiefs of the other U. S. agencies will of course be different in various countries, depending on the personalities of the individuals involved and what each is attempting to accomplish. Conflicts do arise and the MAAG Chief must be aware of the severe repercussions which can result if he is not "informed." A former MAAG Chief, in discussing the country team of which he was once a member, wrote, "In practice it is not a TEAM by any stretch of the imagination."²² The country team normally met once a week and "the military attaches as well as various staff members of the various agencies usually attended these meetings. Various matters were discussed or one or more expounded on matters they thought of general interest. No agenda was prepared or followed. No record was made as to subjects discussed or directives issued. This procedure was dangerous in that on occasion a statement would be made that a directive had been issued or a line of action decided upon at some previous country team meeting. Such statement being in error. To defend against this (and the word defend is used advisedly) Chief MAAG should keep a detailed record of each meeting to include

²²Letter from Lt Gen S. T. Williams, USA, (Ret.), Former Chief, MAAG Vietnam, January 15, 1964.

those present, the subjects discussed, and directives issued or lines of action decided upon."²³

In the particular country team concerned, it was apparently common practice for the chief of U. S. agency to forward a recommendation to his next superior and close the paper with the statement, "The country team concurs." "Unfortunately, this statement is not always correct. Chief MAAG should keep for his own protection and the protection of MAAG and his own military seniors, a very detailed record of such matters, if he knows of them. The time will arise sooner or later when Chief MAAG will be questioned by his own military superiors as to why he concurred in a paper going to State for example, that was contrary to a view he had previously expressed to DOD. By maintaining a close record he is in a position to show proof of his actions."²⁴

If the country team submits a recommendation to the Department of State or Defense or any other Washington office, and the MAAG Chief does not concur then he "must insist that the paper carry the notation 'Chief MAAG does not concur.' These two points are of utmost importance. If not careful Chief MAAG may find himself being required to defend a course of action, even before a Congressional Committee, that he knew to be wrong in the beginning. Or defend the expenditure of large sums of money before such a Committee when in fact he knew nothing of the project nor the sums of money prior to the investigation."²⁵

²³Ibid.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Ibid.

Another problem area of considerable importance concerns the possibility of conflicting instructions. "Not infrequently, the Head of Mission will issue instructions that Chief MAAG cannot carry out due to Army, Navy or Air Force regulations. Matters involving post exchange, commissaries, recreation funds and medical installations for example. Chief MAAG should reply to such instructions in writing as a matter of record. He should make his position unmistakably clear by quoting existing regulations, or furnishing copies for the ambassador and his staff to read. To give in to the whim of the ambassador, by violating regulations, would surely cause the MAAG Chief to get into serious difficulty with his own military superiors. Chief MAAG should also inform his immediate military superior of any illegal directives he receives from the Head of Mission and the action he has taken to resolve the matter."²⁶

As we have seen, the ambassador has weighty instruments of control at his disposal, including his rank and prestige and the power to ask for the withdrawal of any American official in his country. However, whether or not he genuinely achieves a harmonious pattern of overseas representation may depend more on his personal qualities and attitudes and on the effectiveness of his leadership than on his formal attributes of authority.²⁷ The MAAG Chief must exert the full power of his personal leadership abilities to insure

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Jernegan, p. 87.

that he, as well as his troops, are correct in conduct and actions at all times.²⁸

"Chief MAAG should ever keep in mind that the ambassador is the senior American official in the country to which he is accredited. At the same time he must not lose sight of the fact that he, as a U. S. military officer, has responsibilities to his own military superiors and subordinates; that he cannot in any manner compromise U. S. military standards of ethics and standards of conduct to appease any official-military or civilian, foreign or domestic. To do so would cast unacceptable reflection on the military of the United States."²⁹

The MAAG Chief and the ambassador can, if they cooperate together, be of tremendous help to each other. In one large MAAG the ambassador and the MAAG Chief worked hand-in-glove. If the head-of-state called for the ambassador it usually meant a problem was brewing. When such a call was received, the ambassador would contact the MAAG Chief immediately. The MAAG Chief in turn would contact his host country counterpart and ask what the problem was. The MAAG Chief would then relay his information and a recommended solution to the ambassador. The ambassador, more often than not, well briefed on the exact problem of the moment, would call on the head-of-state confident and prepared. Such a common sense relationship

²⁸Letter from S. T. Williams, January 15, 1964.

²⁹Ibid.

avoided much needless stress and strain. This harmonious relationship is particularly valuable when the host country officials attempt to by-pass the MAAG Chief or when he needs help to get action on certain projects.³⁰

In discussing the problems which can arise in overseas areas the Draper Report observed that, "we sometimes give modern weapons merely to placate the political feelings of the recipient, not because such weapons are deemed essential to the success of a regional security plan. Iran received 133,000 new rifles only after the Shah hinted that he would seek other sources of supply if the United States did not deliver them. MAAG Chiefs frequently complain that requests for new equipment processed through their desks seldom get results, while the recipient governments can obtain results by going directly to the State Department or dealing with a special Presidential envoy. The magazines available overseas regularly carry pictures of the latest equipment models which are barely out of the testing stages. Indigenous personnel start asking when such-and-such a weapon will be made available to them, long before it is even issued in any quantities to U. S. line units."³¹

Identification of Leaders

Another of the key challenges to the MAAG Chief and other United States agency heads overseas lies in the development of indigenous leaders. There is ample evidence available to indicate that

³⁰Interview with Maj Gen G. W. Smythe, USA, (Ret.), Former Chief, MAAG Taiwan, February 11, 1964.

³¹U. S., Supplement to the Composite Report of the President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program, Vol II, (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 82.

one of the main roadblocks to progress in the Afro-Asian countries is the severe shortage of personnel capable of assuming the reins of leadership in government, industry, and other fields. If we are to deter communism, then we must meet this challenge by assisting the host country in leadership development.³²

The country team plays a most important role in the identification of potential leaders. In fact, the success of the entire effort depends on wisdom and foresight in the choice of potential "leader trainees." The Draper Report contends that this burden of identification and selection falls squarely on the U. S. field organizations abroad. This includes the Diplomatic Mission, the Operations Mission of ICA, the U. S. Information Service and the MAAG. In this regard the Country Team is required to prepare lists of promising candidates. In addition, the U. S. agencies must have sufficient rapport with the cooperating government to influence the latter's selection processes. The Country Team must cooperate in this joint endeavor in order to insure that they have full data on all U. S. programs, both official and private, for which prospective trainees qualify. It is also important that the Country Team be alert to the need for training leaders and managerial talent drawn from all non-Communist groups.

The importance of developing these civilian and military "leader trainees" cannot be overemphasized. Coordination among the country team agencies is essential.³³ "The MAAGs can assist the

³²Ibid., p. 145.

³³Ibid., pp. 147-148.

International Cooperation Administration in the identification of officers who should be trained for key responsibilities in other than narrowly military fields. ICA can assist in the establishment of middle level courses in local education facilities for instruction of officers in civil administration, finance, law, and management."³⁴ The MAAG Chief "should support regional conferences to improve personal contacts and promote exchange of ideas and techniques among the military men of adjacent countries."³⁵ The Draper Report emphasizes that "a key influence in aiding the development of military leaders of superior motivation and the integrity may well be that exerted by the MAAG personnel."³⁶ This function of the MAAG will be discussed in detail in a subsequent chapter.

The Draper Report delineated five major areas of concern which the State Department, and the Defense Department by parallel actions, should focus their attention, to encourage development of leadership and administrative potential in the less-developed countries. The first area is the "development of high level leadership." It is recommended that in this area the U. S. authorities should:

1. Collaborate with and offer technical and other assistance to the host government in establishment of machinery and procedures to survey and analyze priority manpower needs.
2. Cooperate with the host country in developing training plans to meet critical known needs for decision-making, managerial, and professional personnel and actively participate in the selection process.

³⁴Ibid., p. 148.

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Ibid.

3. Develop coordinated U. S. plans, as necessary, to help insure balanced coverage, particularly with respect to the private sector and the non-Communist opposition.

4. Determine ways of more fully utilizing the ICA university contract program to support leadership development activities through scholarship competitions, grants for faculty development and student overseas study.³⁷

In the second major area, "to encourage expansion of indigenous educational systems," the U. S. authorities should:

1. Encourage the host country in the latter's development of sound long-range plans for expansion of its educational systems.

2. Provide reasonable financial assistance where such is justified in meeting priority needs under mutually agreed long-range plans.

3. Assess independently the priority needs of the educational system and optimum level of U. S. support.³⁸

The third major area is "to better utilize the educational potential of foreign military establishments." In this respect the

Draper Report recommends that the United States should:

1. Conduct field studies of the feasibility of using local military establishments for promoting education, especially in literacy and vocational training.

2. Make use of MAAG facilities to help identify promising military personnel for IES and ICA grants and scholarships to prepare them for non-military responsibilities and remove present restrictions on IES and ICA authority to provide grants to military personnel.

³⁷Ibid., pp. 157-158.

³⁸Ibid., p. 158.

3. Support the development of higher level military schools in the host country with curricula to include broad national political and economic matters.

4. Encourage and assist the host ministry of defense in developing improved troop information programs.³⁹

The fourth major area of concern with which the U. S. Government agencies are to focus their attention to encourage development of leadership potential is "to insure improvement of the U. S. advisory capacities." In order to insure improvement of the U. S. advisory role, the U. S. governmental agencies concerned should:

1. Require, as feasible, program personnel to develop a comprehensive knowledge of the local traditions, attitudes, culture, customs and significant undercurrents as well as to develop extensive personal contacts in all strata of society as the underpinning of advisory efforts in leadership development.

2. Discourage and penalize any tendency by the American advisor to do the task himself and encourage instead the tolerance and forbearance characteristic of the true teacher.

3. Insist upon demonstration by U. S. program personnel of the highest standards of integrity and ethics in professional and personal conduct.⁴⁰

The fifth and last major area of concern is the "improvement of training environment within the United States." Since this last major area of concern does not pertain to the country team directly, only the recommendation which is of interest will be mentioned. This is the recommendation that "a vigorous interdepartmental task force

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰Ibid.

specifically designed to tackle the problem of identifying and assisting in the training and education of a selective group of potential national leaders for those portions of the underdeveloped world -- particularly Africa -- newly emerging as nations"⁴¹ should be organized.

Thus we see that the country team must function in a coordinated, joint effort if the United States is to achieve success in the major areas of concern listed above. The importance of these areas is such that they merit detailed treatment in subsequent chapters of this paper. It has been determined that one of the major leadership problems which confront present day MAAG Chiefs concerns the development and orientation of existing and potential leaders of newly emerging and developing nations.

In conclusion we can say that the MAAG Chief and the ambassador must work together to insure that they keep in perspective all American interests and activities in the country. The country team must insure that their policy or action recommendations are balanced, that the woods are not being overlooked for the trees and that the enthusiasm of individuals for their own programs do not carry them away. They must know all the implications of proposed courses of action, and thus be prepared to decide what is best for American interests as a whole. The greater the problems, the more need for mutual help and understanding.⁴²

⁴¹Ibid., p. 159.

⁴²Jernegan, p. 86.

CHAPTER IV

THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE MAAG CHIEF

A serious examination of the leadership problems confronting the MAAG Chief must of necessity include an analysis of the dominant role which the foreign military officer corps has assumed in developing countries of the free world. What are the implications of the ascendancy of the military in these nations and how does this phenomenon affect the leadership responsibilities of the MAAG Chief? It is generally recognized that the establishment and growth of democratic representative government throughout the free world, especially in the newly emergent nations of Asia and Africa is one of the basic goals of American foreign policy. However, during the past fifteen years political instability has been a characteristic of the majority of these new nations. This political instability, which is sometimes chronic, has been caused by such things as high illiteracy rates, economic problems, irresponsible politicians and bureaucratic bungling. Many Afro-Asian countries have veered from a democratic form of government to one which is more authoritarian and military in nature. This trend occurred in Sudan, Pakistan, Burma, Thailand, Indonesia and South Vietnam. In some countries such as Egypt, Jordan, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, democracy failed to develop at all. In Morocco, Tunisia,

Lebanon, Iran, Ceylon, Cambodia, Laos and South Korea, democracy ran into serious trouble.¹ The Communist leaders in Moscow and Peking have taken advantage of this political instability and have adopted their strategy accordingly. They have resorted to violence, subversion, guerrilla warfare, infiltration of governments, establishment of fronts and, when the need suits them, "peaceful" parliamentary procedures in their quest for power. The big question raised is whether or not these developing nations can afford to "muddle" through another ten or fifteen years while they master the art of democratic government. The answer lies in comparing the present system of political parties of the developing nations with the well-organized disciplined Communist parties of opposing nations.²

The Military Elite

The only organization which appears to have a chance to combat this Communist expansion and penetration in the Afro-Asian nations is the military officer corps. The officer corps of the new nations represents, on the whole, the most patriotic and politically moderate elements. In most cases, the officer corps is young and dedicated. It enjoys the prestige of having fought successfully for national independence. Having fought against the Communist guerrilla movements in many cases, these officers will not be as likely to fall

¹U. S. Supplement to the Composite Report of the President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program, Vol II (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 78.

²Ibid.

fall for Communist promises. Since Communism normally appeals to the people who feel they are barred to advancement and lack discipline and direction, the officer corps is relatively invulnerable. This is particularly true in Southeast Asia. Today, the military officer corps in many of the underdeveloped countries, particularly in South and Southeast Asia, has already emerged as a major political force. Some of the civilian governments which were run by dishonest politicians and inefficient administrators, have fallen into disrepute. The officer corps, given the choice of either assuming control of the government or standing by and watching their nation disintegrate economically and politically, have taken charge. Trained and equipped by British or American armed forces, these officer corps have placed their countries on the road to stability and governmental efficiency.³

The President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program said: "It would seem to be in the best interest of the United States to continue to provide substantial military and economic assistance to governments operated by military elites. They need military equipment and training to prepare their armed forces for the difficult task of maintaining internal security against Communist subversion and generally to enhance their prestige."⁴

The Emerging Nations

The MAAG Chief cannot for one moment allow himself the luxury of naivete concerning his responsibilities and the personal leadership he may be required to exercise when the host country is one of the

³Ibid., 79

⁴Ibid.

underdeveloped or newly emerging states. Therefore, it is essential that the MAAG Chief achieves a clear appreciation of the significance of military developments in the new countries of Africa and Asia and the leadership that may be required of him as one of the most influential representatives of the United States.

During the last fifteen years, newly emerging nations have become increasingly important. This is indeed ironic considering the fact that they possess such an infinitesimal amount of military power when compared to the two nuclear giants, the United States and Russia.⁵

Nevertheless, nearly every major issue of defense policy during the last fifteen years has required fundamental considerations of the underdeveloped areas. The countries which have the least militarily significant forces have become paradoxically important and increasingly frustrating and annoying from a foreign policy point of view. As a result, military assistance has grown in importance both economically and politically since World War II. The United States has used military assistance to aid in fighting Communist forces in both Greece and Nationalist China. We have used it to assist the weak countries bordering the Communist bloc. Since the Korean conflict large amounts of U. S. military aid have been sent to various countries to provide internal security against guerrilla and irregular forces. We have also used military assistance as a diplomatic means to strengthen our political

⁵ Lucian W. Pye, Military Development in the New Countries, A Report submitted to the Research Group in Psychology and the Social Sciences (Washington: Smithsonian Institution, 1961), pp. 1-2

ties with underdeveloped countries. However, it is imperative in the overall mutual security program that first priority be given to strategic-military necessity -- not only for strategic but also for economic reasons. Insecurity is incompatible with economic development. Therefore, military weakness sooner or later will be exploited by aggressors or subversives. The conflict resulting from such weakness would be far more costly than a solid military program designed to prevent national instability and disintegration. One of the most serious problems facing underdeveloped countries is the development of organizational know-how and firm political leadership. Military programs encompass both of these purposes.⁶

Middle East

The importance of the MAAG Chief's role in influencing the thinking and ideas of the leaders of the developing nations cannot be overemphasized. The close relationship which often develops between the MAAG Chief and his host country counterpart may have far reaching strategic effects on the host nation's policies and aims. The Middle East in particular provides some evidence and insight of the importance which the military has attained in many relatively undeveloped nations.

Soldiers have governed a majority of the Middle Eastern countries almost continuously for at least a millennium. It is hardly suprising therefore, that in 1961 the Army ruled five of the seventeen countries between Morocco and Pakistan (namely, Egypt, Turkey, Sudan, Iraq, and Pakistan), and constituted the principal organizational support of the government in eight others (Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Syria, Afghanistan, and Algeria). Since 1930, military

coups have overturned governments on at least twenty-three occasions in this area, and many other times pressure from the army or an army faction proved decisive in altering the composition of government and the direction of policies. There has never been a tradition in the Middle East of separating military from civilian authority. Quite the contrary. The common way for a leader in traditional Islam to form a state (that is, to achieve rule over people not his own kin) was to conquer. Religious conversion might create the nucleus of an empire or win additional adherents (as exemplified by the beginnings of the Islamic empire), but conquest was invariably its main expanding force. The Prophet Mohammed and the Caliphs after him always bore the responsibility of being "Commander of the Faithful".⁷

The Draper Report emphasizes the importance of the military by pointing out that in addition to providing stable and efficient government and improving the internal security of their countries, these officer corps can, and should, be encouraged to utilize their organizational strength and potential leadership capabilities to make more effective use of their nations's economic resources and foreign economic assistance. In many of these countries, the military, as dynamic agents of social and economic reform represent an effective alternative to Communist extremism. In fact, the officer corps has already emerged as the major vehicle of socioeconomic reform in many countries.⁸

Concerning the importance of the military in the Middle East, Manfred Halpern said:

As the army officer corps came to represent the interest and views of the new middle class, it became the most powerful instrument of that class. The army's great strength

⁷ Manfred Halpern, "Middle Eastern Armies and the New Middle Class", The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, ed. John J. Johnson (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 277.

⁸ U. S., Supplement to the Composite Report of the President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program, II, 80.

lay in the kind of men who joined it, the opportunities at their disposal, and the weakness of competing institutions. In contrast to most Middle Eastern political parties, armies are disciplined, well-organized and able to move into action without securing the voluntary consent of their members. In contrast to modern Middle Eastern bureaucracies, armies are less likely to diffuse responsibility within the hierarchy and are more prone to rebel against the status quo. This combination of discipline and defiance remains almost unique among Middle Eastern organizations. Only in Tunisia and Morocco have political parties and trade unions shown superior capabilities and have thus shaded the political importance of the army. Almost everywhere else, modern armies have offered the most power to those who most wanted it. They have served as national standard-bearers when others who claimed that role proved irresponsible and ineffective.⁹

Even more surprising than the important role which the military has assumed in the developing nations is the fact that there is relatively limited documented research material available concerning this critical facet of contemporary history.

Only a few years ago it was generally assumed that the future of the newly emergent states would be determined largely by the activities of their Westernized intellectuals, their socialistically inclined bureaucrats, their nationalist ruling parties, and possibly their menacing Communist parties. It occurred to few students of the underdeveloped regions that the military might become the critical group in shaping the course of nation-building. Now that the military has become the key decision-making element in at least eight of the Afro-Asian countries, we are confronted with the awkward fact that there has been almost no scholarly research on the role of the military in the political development of the new states.¹⁰

While there is limited information available concerning the question of how and why the military has assumed such a powerful role in the development of these new states, we must search for the answers. Concerning the Middle East, the Draper Report reveals that in many

⁹ Halpern, 286-87.

¹⁰ Lucian W. Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization," The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, Johnson, 69.

instances military assistance may be the best means of bringing about the greatest internal stability to a country by giving, the greatest satisfaction to those elite groups who are eager to keep the country out of Communist control. History indicates that a strong military establishment can foster national stability. It gives the government authority and prestige and offers to many a chance of social and technical advancement. History also cautions us however, that all demands for military assistance are not justified in terms of American interest. Military autocracies are not always stable or reliable. In some cases, as in Syria and Iraq, the leaders of the armed forces or influential junior officers have gone over to the Communist side. Too much militarization may disrupt the economies of underdeveloped countries, or it may create concern in adjacent non-Communist countries or develop bitter antagonism between non-Communist neighbors such as has occurred between Pakistan and India. These dangers necessitate that the MAAG Chief continually and carefully scrutinize military assistance to determine when such assistance is having an adverse effect.¹¹

Latin America

Latin America is one example where the military in the past have exerted tremendous influence in the political sphere. History indicates that many times this military influence left something to be desired in the realm of national progress and well being. Nevertheless, we must examine this vast area, of such strategic importance to the free world, to see what role the military played and is now assuming

¹¹U. S., Supplement to the Composite Report of the President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program, II, 40-41.

in national development. The role played by the military is apparent when we see that during the period 1930 to 1957, fifty-six military men held the presidential office of Latin-American republics for a year or more.¹²

The recent decades of rapid change and social crisis in Latin America brought the armed forces back into a position of political prominence they had not held since the nineteenth century. At the time of World War I, a declining fraction of the total area and population was dominated by the military, and by 1928 only six Latin American countries containing but 15 percent of the total population were ruled by military regimes. Then, abruptly, following the onset of the world depression in 1930, the trend was reversed. There occurred a striking relapse into militarism. A rough measure of this phenomenon, though not always fool-proof, was the number of presidents in uniform. In Argentina, for example, after several decades of civilian rule, eight out of ten presidents between 1930 and 1957 were generals or colonels. In those countries which had never developed a civilian tradition in politics, like the republics of the Caribbean and Central America, the military tradition not only continued but was reinforced.¹³

The influence of the MAAG Chief's personal leadership, his concepts on ways of government and his views on the relationship of the military to the civilian government will often have far reaching effects. Edwin Lieuwen points out in his analysis of militarism and politics in Latin America that throughout that part of the Western hemisphere, the army was the strongest and most politically minded of the three services. Before World War II the air forces had no significance. The navies, though less politically minded than armies, usually remained unified and had less intraservice rivalry. This was true despite the fact that a naval career carried more social prestige in

¹²Edwin Lieuwen, "Militarism and Politics in Latin America", The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, Johnson, 138.

¹³Ibid., 131.

certain countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru, and consequently the naval officers generally came from the upper classes. In spite of this, the navy's aristocratic tendencies were moderated by the democratic views of British and United States professional advisors.¹⁴

Thus, the pre-World War II U. S. Navy versions of the MAAG Chief and his advisors admirably performed the task of orienting the host country's military element. On the otherhand, the authoritarian attitudes of Latin-American armies were, during this same period, being reinforced by German, Spanish and Italian army missions.¹⁵ The latter contributed to the fact that "militarism" the domination of the military man over the civilian; the undue emphasis upon military demands or any transcendence by the armed forces of "true military purposes", has been and is a fact of life in Latin America.

Since World War II only Uruguay, Costa Rica, Chile, and Mexico have been free of serious military meddling in civilian affairs. In a majority of the other republics the personnel of the armed forces repeatedly have mobilized violence for political purposes. Between October 1945, and the end of September 1957, de facto regimes succumbed to military pressure or armed rebellion in all but five of the twenty republics.¹⁶

In Latin America the armed forces have played an antidespotic, political role by intervening to terminate the impossible tyranny of one of their own brothers-in-arms on occasion. They have also supplied corrective measures to the corrupt excesses of civilian

¹⁴ Ibid., 140

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ John J. Johnson, "The Latin American Military as a Politically Competing Group in Transitional Society", The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, Johnson, p. 91.

politicians. The Brazilian armed forces in 1945 terminated the Vargas dictatorship. The same thing occurred to Joao Goulant in 1964.¹⁷

There is growing evidence that young officers who have associated with American military officers have become conscious of the rigid separation of the American officers professional and political interests. The United States attitude towards the role of the military has had some apparent effect on host countries and possess some interesting future possibilities. For instance, practically all of the Venezuelan officers who participated in the initial acts against Perez Jimenez had previous assignments in the United States. The responsibilities of the United States MAAG officers with respect to their host country counterparts in this area of policy guidance is clear. In Latin America as in the Afro-Asian countries we will continue to insure that the military take an active and often dominant role in national politics. The beneficial effects of United States officers offering their views to their counterparts on the functions and responsibilities of the military may serve to counterbalance the wrongful use of indigenous forces for selfish, misguided purposes.¹⁸

Large numbers of the Latin American officer corps have become more conscious of the proper role of their armed forces in national affairs. The concept of the "good soldier" became better understood by the officer corps as a result of travel and training in the United States and by the activities of the U. S. military missions in Latin America. The armed forces of this area have copied the techniques

¹⁷Lieuwen, 149.

¹⁸Johnson, 129.

and procedures of the more advanced countries. With tremendous strides in modern military technology, the officers are beginning to realize that genuine military expertise demands full time professional training and years of study and experience with little or no time for political activities. While the European military missions flourished prior to World War II, the United States at the outbreak of that great conflagration attained, and now maintains, a virtual monopoly on military missions to Latin America. "The attitudes of United States officers toward their profession and their role in society, and indeed the very training in the arts of war which they imparted, did not fail to influence somewhat the outlook and the attitudes of their Latin American colleagues."¹⁹

Africa

Another recent example of the influence of the military in newly emerging states was found in the Congo. The role of the Force Publique in the Congo crisis has had a profound impact upon the thinking of the civilian and military leaders in Africa's new states. The Sudanese military coup was understandable since organizational strength of the army was manifestly superior to other organizations of Sudanese society. The Congolese Force Publique, however, had no indigenous officers, no service tradition, and commanded little popular respect and support. Yet, in the absence of other power structures, even this armed mob was willing to follow untrained leadership and was able to exert a surprising degree of control over both civilian leaders

¹⁹Lieuwen, 162-63.

and events. This demonstrated the powerful influence which a small military force could exercise in a situation in which countervailing institutions or power groups are absent.²⁰ Thus a new light begins to dawn on the role played by military forces in newly emerging nations. The same considerations apply equally to the newly developing nations. It is now no longer merely a question of internal security but of national development, national survival and national pride. The major role played by the military in the national development of Pakistan, Burma, Indonesia, Turkey and Egypt has resulted from previous conditions of chronic internal disorder, foreign military aid or the threat of international conflict.²¹

Consider for a moment the tremendous benefits gained by the individual soldier in these transitional societies. He learns to read and write, to drive a truck, to accept discipline and to practice personal hygiene. He leaves his village, for the first time perhaps, and he sees how other people live. He learns new skills, attitudes, and values which will contribute to the transformation of a peasant oriented society to a modernized, technologically advanced society. While the recruits are becoming modernized soldiers, they are also becoming useful citizens for a modernized society. However, the most important benefit accrued is that service in the armed forces of these nations instills a sense of national loyalty in the soldiers. In this manner, military development is a powerful force in producing a politically loyal citizenry.²²

²⁰James S. Coleman and Belmont Brice, Jr., "The Role of the Military in Sub-Saharan Africa", The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, Johnson, p. 399.

²¹Pye, Military Development in the New Countries, p. 26.

²²Ibid., 30-31

A unique problem is found in Africa. Armies have been the last of the authoritative structures of government to be created in all but a few of the forty-odd political entities of Sub-Saharan Africa. With few exceptions, national armies are either nonexistent, or they are fragile structures still heavily dependent upon external support for their maintenance and development. This embryonic and underdeveloped character of Africa's military establishments, coupled with the precipitate and unexpected termination of European rule, underscores the ominous power vacuum that exists throughout that vast continent. African states lack what many other new states of the former colonial world have had, namely, an army which could be a modernizing and stabilizing source of organizational strength in society, a last stand-by reserve which would be called in, or could take over, to prevent external subversion or a total collapse of the political order.²³

In most newly developing, newly emerging nations, the military is an arm of the civil government. Historically, the military has been an important authoritarian element of national government. This brings us to the delicate relationship of the military to civil and governmental authorities. In the developing nations there is usually a problem of establishing effective organizations to administer and control the functions of a modern society. Frequently the organization which is in being is called upon to perform the necessary economic and administrative functions of a modern civilization. The military organizations of these nations are ideally suited to take over these duties because the armed forces are usually organized first for reasons mentioned earlier in this chapter. That is, often the only real feeling of inferiority experienced by many of the national leaders of these developing nations is assuaged with the birth of the nation's armed forces. Thus, the military leaders find themselves in control

²³Coleman and Brice., p. 359.

of the most effective general purpose organization of the nation and are usually either called on or forced by circumstances, to assume the duties of civil authorities.²⁴

Southeast Asia

The underdeveloped societies of today have shown little tendency to deprive themselves of the developmental value of military organizations simply because the more advanced nations shun the idea of the military engaging upon functions which are essentially civilian responsibilities. This is particularly true in troubled Southeast Asia. For example we find that:

Military leaders have played a dominant role in the politics of Thailand for a long time. This role has gone unchallenged and the military has experienced its ups and downs, but for twenty-four of the years since the kingdom became a constitutional regime in 1932 the military, particularly the army, has ruled. Army officers have led the ruling group, dominated the institutions of government, and set the style of Thai politics.²⁵

As Indonesia goes into its precarious second decade, initially at least as a "guided democracy", its future depends in large part on the role of the military and the relationships of the officer corps to the other elites and power groups in the country. The officer corps, particularly of the army and the air force, looms as one of the major sources of political power and administrative capacity in the country, along with the Communist Party and with the radical nationalists.²⁶

This military dominance erupted in Burma.

The army's distrust of civilian leadership crystallized in the summer of 1958 when U Nu, in efforts to strengthen his government, indicated a willingness

²⁴Pye, Military Development in the New Countries, p. 26.

²⁵David A. Wilson, "The Military in Thai Politics", The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, Johnson, p. 253.

²⁶Guy J. Pauker, "The Role of the Military in Indonesia", The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, Johnson, p. 185.

to deal with the Communists and other insurrectionaries. Shock and consternation at the thought of treating with a decade-old foe were enough to unite the army behind the decision of its leaders to assume power. The ease with which the Burmese Army was able to command a decisive political role stemmed in large part from the inability of the civilian groups to perform their functions effectively. The failings of the civilian leadership are far too numerous even to be listed here. They included the usual difficulties that have retarded development in most of the newly emergent states. In the case of Burma, most of these difficulties can be summarized as a failure to develop effective relationships between those in administrative roles and those performing political roles.²⁷

Strategic Responsibilities of the MAAG Chief

As the principal military representative of the United States, the MAAG Chief must be prepared to analyze fully the potentialities he has in the administration of military aid and in his association with the host country military. The MAAG Chief must be aware of the very real danger of the military becoming an obstacle to social change and he should develop techniques to impress upon the military leaders of the new countries a strong sense of responsibility and of pride in profession. The MAAG Chief is in an excellent position to help create the appropriate sets of attitudes and values in the military leaders of the developing nations. Through his personal leadership the MAAG Chief has the basis for informing the host country military about the contributions and the limitations of armies in building nations. There is no other group of people in the developing countries with whom we have more associations at an official level than the military officer corps.

²⁷ Lucien W. Pye, "The Army in Burmese Politics", The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, Johnson, p. 239.

Are the MAAG Chiefs aware of their "strategic" leadership responsibilities?

The generals and colonels in charge of most military-assistance advisory groups abroad, many of them able soldiers with excellent records as combat leaders and peacetime administrators, usually believe their function to be limited to the training of troops in the use of modern weapons and advising on military organization and tactics. Yet in a dozen countries or more the foreign military officers we have trained are almost bound to have a powerful (or as we have recently seen in the Middle East, a controlling) voice in determining the political composition of their own civilian government, its foreign policy posture, and the direction of economic-development programs.²⁸

The observation that some aid leads to the expectation of further aid points to another military-assistance objective - to encourage the armed forces of recipient countries to cooperate with the United States, not only in narrowly defensive matters but also in various other constructive activities. The official handbook on The Military Assistance Program states that in addition to insuring correct care and use of MAP provided equipment and a sound indigenous training base, MAP training is to achieve a most important strategic objective. MAP training is designed to create friendship and good will toward the United States and to orient foreign nationals toward American ideals. In this connection, the MAAG Chief has the challenging task of exerting his personal leadership in the delicate and sometimes hazardous orientation of his counterpart and other host country officials.²⁹

²⁸Harlan Cleveland, Gerard J. Mangone, and John Clarke Adams, The Overseas Americans (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1960 p. 79.

²⁹Amos A. Jordan, Jr. Foreign Aid and the Defense of Southeast Asia (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1962), p. 36.

In "The Overseas American" the authors feel that many American government people overseas too seldom make the connection between their own narrow specialties' intermediate goals and the development of free and strong political institutions. They apparently are too short sighted and fail to visualize the long range goal and the political implications.

On the military side the responses are equally devoid of political content; there are many references to foiling the Russian aggression, a few mentions of internal security, and silence on political institutions building -- although in most non-European countries in which we have military aid programs, the actual priority of significance is precisely the opposite. If you ask directly about political impacts, you will generally be told that these are matters for the 'political people' over at the embassy. The jurisdictional sensitivity thereby displayed is charming, but the referral is simple evasion. It is not the 'political people' who are in day-to-day contact with the rising 'middle class' of Army officers and economic planners. Moreover some of our ambassadors are ill-equipped by training or inclination to provide the executive leadership to United States elements outside the embassy proper that would be necessary if the operation of military, economic and information programs were to be shifted to the shoulders of the ambassadors.³⁰

To realize the full potential of his military associations, the MAAG Chief must be cognizant of the danger of the historic Western feelings about a clear division between civil and military spheres. He must be fully conversant with the full role that the military can play in the nation-building process or he may discover that those involved in building the doctrine for American policy in the host country, the ambassador and other members of the "country team", may tend to neglect the most promising instrument in the nation-building process, the military.

³⁰ Cleveland, Mangone, and Adams, p. 80.

While recognizing the vast potential of the military of the developing nations to facilitate economic and political advancement, the MAAG Chief must also be highly conscious of how frequently the military have constituted a major obstacle to all forms of social, economic and political progress. Historically, underdeveloped countries have suffered from the effects of incompetent and backward looking military leaders.

With these considerations in mind, the MAAG Chief must strive to facilitate national development by strengthening the feeling of responsibility in the officers of the host country armed forces and ensuring that our assistance to the military of the developing nations will advance their national well being.

CHAPTER V

THE ROLE AND PROBLEMS OF THE MILITARY ADVISOR

The importance of the U. S. military advisor's potential influence on the leaders of the host country is clearly apparent from the volume of available evidence. However, the methods and techniques used by the advisors to accomplish their missions and tasks are also of importance and warrant some detailed discussion.

The MAAG Chief, as the senior military advisor, must be cognizant not only of his own role but he must be aware of the problems which his subordinate advisors will encounter. The problems facing these subordinate advisors encompass such a wide range that they present the MAAG Chiefs with a tremendous challenge.

The MAAG Chief is responsible for what his command does and for what it fails to do. If he is to succeed in his mission he must use his wisdom and ingenuity. Most of all, he must be an outstanding leader. He may have advisors living in remote outposts which are virtually isolated from modern civilization. His advisors may be working with a population totally different in race, color, religion, morals, beliefs, customs and traditions. Additionally, the climate and the terrain are foreign to the U. S. Advisor. Faced with such imposing obstacles and barriers, how does the MAAG Chief avoid frustration, hostility, indifference and failure?

"One U. S. military advisor, in a country of the Middle East, commenting on preparations for advisory duty in that country, said: "Without being facetious, I recommend a course in winning friends and influencing people who are opposed to being won and are intent upon remaining uninfluenced."¹ "

He suggested that his replacement should be so oriented that before reaching the country, "he should have accepted that the theory and practice of advisorship are only indistinctly related; that advice will rarely be sought, less frequently accepted, and almost never followed. Prepare him for apathy, indifference, and an attitude toward his presence fluctuating wildly between that of meager toleration and the unwelcome."² In preparing his replacement for daily living he recommended that stress be laid on all subjects pertinent to the country in a manner that will emphasize doing the commonplace with difficulty. He considered language training essential.⁴

In commenting on the day to day problems which he encountered he stated, "There is no facet of daily life that does not, in the course of the day present a problem. We are continuously laboring at the destruction of mountains that suddenly erupt from mole hills. In a country where no incident is too insignificant to come to the attention of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, it can be expected that much time is devoted to trivia. An idle stroll through

¹Student Field Report, Military Assistance Institute, Washington, D. C., May 9, 1960 (in the files of the Director of Research), MAI, p.1.

²Ibid.

the market place is as apt as not to foster charges of having been only an excuse for ogling the women. A broken axle on an advisor's jeep will be forwarded by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces to the Chief of the Army Section for investigation. Even minor requisitions submitted by field units must be approved for issue at ministry level. I sincerely doubt that it is possible for a person to become embittered in this assignment as there is so much that is laughable; Gilbert and Sullivan from start to finish."³

In conclusion and on the basis of all the foregoing comments this advisor expressed the belief that the U. S. military assistance advisors "have laboriously progressed from nothing to complete failure. Probably because of the human resources and methods of selection. Confronted with problems for which we have neither training nor appetite we jump promptly to the conclusion that those to whom our great truths are not self-evident are undeserving and therefore without entitlement. Even more promptly we revert to doing the things that must be done and pre-occupying ourselves with our own supply of T-bones and ice cream. Nowhere is there a realization of the fact that if the Reds approached the problem as we do they'd still be trying to take Moscow; nowhere is there an appreciation that the job at hand requires missionary zeal and nowhere is there greater need accompanied by such companionable absence."⁴

The implications which can be deduced from this statement serve to illustrate the need for decisive leadership by the MAAG

³ Ibid., 3

⁴ Ibid.

Chief. The leadership problems which are encountered by the commander of a tactical unit seem tame in comparison to those of the military advisor.

"The language problem is one of many problems which serve to complicate the military advisor's task. Often, as in Korea, the native language does not contain words such as machine gun or headlight. Some Koreans described the machine gun as "a gun-of-many-loud-noises" and a headlight might be called "candle-in-a-shiny-bowl". Other expressions such as "phase line", "zone", and "movement by bounds", were impossible for literal translation into Korean. Such a simple term as "squad" had to be explained exhaustively before a Korean soldier knew what was meant. The use of descriptive phrases did not solve the problem because the accuracy of the descriptions depended upon the imaginations of individual linguists. Often the interpretations were inconsistent and ranged from the ingenious to the inadequate. Where one interpreter might refer to the machine gun as above, another would call it a "gun-that-shoots-very-fast." To solve this problem, U. S. advisors sometimes used two interpreters at once, in hope that together they might arrive at precise meanings. More often than not this resulted in the linguists arguing at length so that the Korean listeners did not know at all what was being discussed.⁵"

"Another problem which this investigation found to be prevalent, particularly in the Far East, was the reluctance to admit ignorance or lack of understanding about a subject."

⁵ Maj. Robert K. Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea: K MAG in Peace and War, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 63.

"The primary block in the Korean and Japanese commander's characters is his reluctance to admit any kind of ignorance, either by act or by statement, in the presence of his inferiors, his military juniors or himself. This feeling extends to his relations with individuals of other races and countries. Both Korean and Japanese are unwilling to accept advice or education unless it is given in a friendly manner and on the basis that the student is equal to the teacher. Condescension can ruin an advisor's effectiveness." The purpose for which a particular thing is done must be acceptable to the individual to whom the advisor is trying to convey the necessity for any particular action or procedure. Finally, any instructions given should be purposeful, simple, and to the point. Above all, instructions should be brief as possible without making them ineffective. In the mind of the advisor there must exist no false picture of the capabilities of his own countrymen. It is very easy to think impatiently that the worst American soldier never committed a particular boner. This, in most cases, is an untrue exaggeration and oversimplification. The action that corrects the American soldier may be precisely the action which straightens out a Korean or Japanese soldier. Somehow communication must be established.

One senior MAAG Officer also pointed out this critical problem area when discussing the preparation and training of U. S. military advisors for duty in the Far East.

I agree that it is a very good idea for each individual coming to this MAAG to have a good basic knowledge of United States policy, international affairs, and the military assistance program, even though few of them will be directly involved in the implementation thereof. I agree that all should be liberally indoctrinated in the culture and peculiarities of the host country. I should like to add in this field that as far as is humanly possible it would be most desirable to inculcate a limited understanding of the most peculiar functions of the Oriental mind. I have found these people if they want to cooperate, they can be the most cooperative people in the world, but if

"Techniques of Advising: Korea and Japan," Letter to the Director of the Military Assistance Institute, Washington, D. C., October 16, 1959 (in the files of the Director of Research, MAI), p. 2.

they don't want to cooperate, nobody ever saw a more capable demonstration of passive resistance and delaying tactics. You would do well by acquainting our advisors with the subject of "face", which is all important over here. As you know, we have to get everything done by persuasion. Frequently we find things vastly wrong. In our persuasive efforts to get these incorrect situations straightened out, it is most important that the individual responsible be left some out to save his "face". He must never be shown to be completely wrong. This frequently required a compromise with ones principles, and demands unlimited ability to speak with tact."

The oriental will also go to great lengths to prevent the U. S. military advisor from losing face. One advisor found the people of a country in Southeast Asia to be congenial, affable, and easy going.

"These attributes make working relations very agreeable, in fact too agreeable. To avoid discussions for which they are not prepared, they will agree to almost any proposal. On occasions, they will go so far as to put out implementing orders in writing to please the advisors and later rescind them verbally. Result: most of the time an advisor is not in the know concerning his advice - whether it is accepted or rejected. Any plan submitted by an advisor to his counterpart is sure to be changed, if it is adopted at all. There is a fierce pride of authorship among these people. They must place their own personal and unique design into their work. Hence, it is better to "come in through the back door", i.e., place your proposal before your counterpart in such a way that he believes the idea originated with himself."

"Evidence indicates that a thorough knowledge of the customs of the host country is essential to the military advisor if he is to

⁷"Notes from Senior MAAG Officers", Memorandum for Staff and Faculty, Military Assistance Institute, Washington, D. C. (in the files of the Director of Research, MAI), p. 1

⁸Letter from a Senior US Advisor in Vietnam to the Director of the Military Assistance Institute, Washington, D. C., September 11, 1961 (in the files of the Director of Research, MAI), p. 1.

avoid embarrassment and frequent major repercussions. An example of what can happen is illustrated by the following statement by a U. S. military advisor stationed in Vietnam. "I met a group of Vietnamese officers' wives in the village one day. One of the wives I recognized as the wife of the post executive officer whom I had met a few nights previously. She was walking with a group of about five women on the way to market. I waved and smiled at her and said good morning."⁹ The officer's wife completely ignored the U. S. advisor and was apparently deeply embarrassed. The women all hurried on. "The woman has not to this day spoken to or acknowledged me again in any way. She avoids me at every opportunity."¹⁰ The U. S. advisor subsequently determined that "I should not have openly spoke to her with only a casual acquaintance. I later found out that Vietnamese men don't speak to ladies this way and especially Americans should not. All the women in the group were embarrassed and on lookers as well. I had caused the woman to lose face in public."¹¹ "

The necessity for such knowledge was vividly illustrated again and again during the course of this research. "The MAAG Chief would be well advised to insure that his subordinates are properly oriented in the finer points of etiquette and social customs of the host country. The following experience serves to emphasize just how important such

⁹"Indigenous Customs and Culture", Student Field Report, Military Assistance Institute, Washington, D. C. (in the files of the Director of Research, MAI), p. 3.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Ibid.

knowledge may be for the U. S. military advisor. Cambodians avoid unnecessary body contact. They do not even shake hands among themselves, preferring the "palms together and raised in front of the face."¹²

Officials who have been exposed to western civilization, do shake hands, but usually unenthusiastically and often in an embarrassed manner.

At the reception being given by the Chief, MAAG, the officer selected to serve as "greeter" was making a genuine effort to be cordial: As he greeted each guest personally, he bent over and, in a friendly fashion, placed his left hand on the shoulderblade of the guest as he inquired the name so as to announce him. Most of the officials made no overt objection; however, one of the guests was fuming because the MAAG greeter had insulted his wife by putting his hand familiarly on her person, and was on the point of making an issue of the matter. First, I tried to calm the official, explaining that the greeter was very young, and was holding his first such official overseas appointment. Further, he was from a part of the USA noted for its friendliness and hospitality, so I was sure that he had meant his action as a mark of cordiality. Then I called the greeter aside and related to him this conversation, toning down the report so as not to embarrass him unduly, explaining the reason for the misunderstanding and adding several related points of SE Asia etiquette.¹³

Admittedly, such an act would be in doubtful taste at any official function, and the MAAG greeter demonstrated a startling naivete. Unfortunately, however, this case is not too exceptional - for too many of the officers show a surprisingly limited knowledge of the fine points of US etiquette, not to mention the Continental etiquette which is quite standard throughout countries where MAAG operates.¹⁴

Too often military personnel feel that they should concern themselves only with their proficiency in their professional military duties and techniques. The MAAG Chief must dispell this narrow view if it

¹²Student Field Report from Cambodia; Military Assistance Institute Washington, D. C., (in the files of the Director of Research, MAI), p. 2.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Ibid.

exists among his advisors. "Evidence collected during this investigation tends to indicate that while professional competence is essential in MAAG assignments an appreciation of the host country's attitudes and beliefs are equally important. During the preparation of this paper, the fact has emerged that to be effective an advisor must establish a good working relationship with his counterpart. A certain rapport must exist before the advisor can expect to begin to be effective. Often this rapport will be destroyed by ignorance on the part of the advisor. In India an advisor stated: "A close relative of my counterpart's wife died. He called me to say that she was very upset and according to Hindi custom they would be remaining at home for the customary period. I made the usual comments of sympathy to him."¹⁵ The advisor later learned that this was not sufficient. Almost too late, the advisor, who had been a guest in his counterpart's home many times, learned that he should have called on the wife as is the custom. "It was a serious matter in their eyes. Her husband finally realized I probably was unaware of the custom and told me what to do before the period of mourning was over. His wife had been very upset by my seeming indifference."¹⁶ This advisor's actions would have been improved by a better knowledge of Indian religious customs. His ignorance could easily have resulted in the deterioration of rapport with his counterpart.

It appears that tact and diplomacy are also quite essential to the effectiveness of the advisor. In Thailand, "a group of senior officers

¹⁵ Student Field Report from India, Military Assistance Institute, Washington, D. C. (in the files of the Director of Research, MAI), p. 3.

¹⁶ Ibid.

students of the Armed Forces Staff College, were on a bus tour to the RTA [Royal Thai Army] military installations. As a guest, JUSMAG [Joint United States Military Assistance Group] advisor was accompanying the group. The day was hot, the trip long and the advisor was not feeling well. A discussion on needed items of equipment for the branch school was in progress. The branch chief stated that they needed a complete asphalt test set and requested the advisor's opinion. (This set is quite elaborate and the cost is several thousand dollars). The advisor replied, 'I have to pay too much money in taxes to ever agree to spending that much money just for a toy for the RTA. You don't have an asphalt plant and you have no need for the test set. Why don't you request something you need? The Branch Chief was a Major General and he and the others present took this remark as a direct insult. As a result the effectiveness of the advisor was never fully regained during the remainder of his tour. The advisor is and was an excellent officer; however, in a moment of not thinking he damaged his reputation very badly. He could have put his rejection of the idea much more diplomatically and gotten the point across without alienating the group."¹⁷

The MAAG Chief must strive to impart sufficient knowledge and understanding to his subordinate advisors to enable them to truly understand the people. All new advisors should realize that a feeling of apprehension and inadequacy is the rule rather than the exception when first starting advisory work. It should also be realized that the host country counterpart may be experiencing similar emotions about the new advisor.

¹⁷Student Field Report from Thailand, Military Assistance Institute Washington, D. C. (in the files of the Director of Research, MAI), p. 4.

With regard to the people, my fear was that they would find me out - how little I knew. And their fear, I think, was that I would find out how little they knew. This is a common type of situation till you get to know the person better; and they let you know what their problems and needs are. It is very important not to endeavor to try to show up the people you work with - that is not show them how little they know, or try to demonstrate how much you know. It's important to find out what they're doing, what their particular problems are, and to get to know the people you are working with so well that they'll really let their hair down.¹⁸

Turning again to the Middle East we see once again the results which can occur when one isn't aware of the local customs.

"The villagers are good Moslems. . . . We had an engineer here who designed houses. Of course, he put latrines in them. He didn't consult the local people at all on this point. When they finally went up for occupancy, nobody would take them. He couldn't figure out why, so we had an investigation. The whole thing turned out to be because the latrines faced the wrong way. People had their fannies facing Mecca. So we had to tear out the latrines and turn them around."¹⁹

"There are indications that sometimes the host country officers find it difficult to understand American humor. One must be very careful when jesting to avoid giving offense and causing misunderstanding. In Thailand, during a staff meeting, several American officers were discussing the problem of maintenance on a radio relay system with senior Thai officers. It was pointed out that the Royal Thai Air Force was going to supply some of the mobile maintenance teams. One of the American advisors agreed that this was a good approach to solving the

¹⁸ Benjamin Gura, "Interview on Basis for Success", International Cooperation Administration, September 4, 1957 (in the files of the Director of Research, MAI), p. 76.

¹⁹ Harlan Cleveland, Gerard J. Mangone, and John Clarke Adams, The Overseas Americans (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1962), p. 161.

problem. "Another Major that was with me, however, stated that it was about time that the Royal Thai Air Force did some work. Although it was said in jest, the statement had adverse effects since the Wing Commander representing the Royal Thai Air Force on the staff appeared very irritated by the remark. By his statement the American insinuated that the Royal Thai Air Force was not doing anything to help in any way to counter insurgency here in Thailand. Although the Wing Commander did not physically do anything you could tell from looking at him that he was 'burning' inside. However, he maintained his composure and said nothing."²⁰ Thus we find that a typical bit of American humor triggered an adverse feeling in a senior officer of the host country. This is further evidence that the U. S. advisor must be fully aware of all the ramifications involved when working with host country officials. Contrary to popular opinion, there are indications that it does not pay the military advisor to "be yourself." The channels of communication and the rapport so carefully nurtured and cultivated can be ruptured or completely severed by one ill considered remark or action by a thoughtless advisor.

It has been found that the subtle approach is quite often the superior method of accomplishing the mission when working with officers of the host country. One military advisor in India tells of the visit made by a team of three American officers to an Indian division. One of Americans opened his notebook and began to question the Indian officers. The military advisor immediately brought this to the attention of the responsible officer and the notebook was put away. "This manner of

²⁰Student Field Report from Thailand, Military Assistance Institute, Washington, D. C. (in the files of the Director of Research, MAI), p. 6.

conducting 'visits' is very ineffective in that it is offensive to Indian army personnel and gives the team an officious air. Indian army personnel immediately 'clam up' and very little information is offered."²¹ The visiting team of Americans "failed to understand their positions in the country and the Indian army personnel's feelings in this regard."²²

Lieutenant General S. T. Williams, former Chief of MAAG, Vietnam, in discussing the successful implementation of a particularly significant planning program stated,

I want to emphasize that such tasks can be accomplished only if the closest teamwork exists between the members of MAAG and officers or other officials of the host country. In many respects this teamwork is not too hard to achieve. However, you may expect the officials you work with to have a different background from yours and this must be considered. Everybody has to work at it. There may be a language problem and often interpreters will be necessary. One must be very careful about his interpreter. He may have a good interpreter but one that does not understand technical military terms. If he fails to interpret correctly, he may give a false answer or he may give your counterpart a false answer. Conceivably, he might be a Communist agent; they infiltrate all activities.²³

"How does the military advisor solve the problem of gaining the confidence and respect of his counterpart? The evidence collected tends to indicate that more often than not it is a purely personal affair. Where one advisor succeeds, another may fail miserably. A senior MAAG officer's account of what happened in one country illustrates the significance of this problem area. The Chief of a U. S. advisor team made periodic visits to the host country tank battalion commander.

²¹ Student Field Report from India, Military Assistance Institute, Washington, D. C. (in the files of the Director of Research, MAI), p. 6.

²² Ibid.

²³ Lt Gen Samuel T. Williams, USA (Ret), "The Practical Demands of MAAG", The MAP Advisor, Department of Defense (Washington: Military Assistance Institute, 1963), p. 95.

On each visit to the tank battalion the advisor inspected the unit and continually pointed out deficiencies in maintenance and in training. Little if any helpful advice was given as to how to overcome the deficiencies. The advisor eventually lost all communication with the commander. The commander was frequently out when the advisor came to see the²⁴ unit and was antagonistic to any advice that was given.

He [the tank battalion commander] failed to recognize the advisor as an aid and to take advantage of the assistance that was eventually offered. After the advisor in question left and another advisor started to work with the unit, the commander, after a short period of cool reception, recognized the difference in attitude of the new advisor and became very cooperative. "Any new advisor with a foreign army must adopt a helpful rather than critical outlook. He must be extremely tactful in presenting recommendations and findings. He must also propose corrective action within the capability of the advisee and in such a way that the advisee will accept the advice and the advisor as an individual."²⁵

Another illustration of what can be done to establish rapport with the counterpart is furnished by a U. S. military advisor in Vietnam.

"Rapport was at an all time low between the Chief of the Basic Unit Training Group and the two captains and three sergeants who were advisors to his various committees. In fact the Vietnamese captain was openly hostile toward the sergeants and not cordial with the American officers. I myself and the other American captain decided to pay the Vietnamese captain a visit every day just to say hello. We tried to comment favorably on something while we were there. Sometimes we only stayed five minutes. After a while he began to be more friendly. I believe this was effective because no Americans before had tried to be friends nor had they treated him as an equal. Later, developments revealed that his hostility stemmed from a feeling of inferiority because Americans had not made him feel equal."

²⁴Student Field Report, Military Assistance Institute, Washington, D. C. (in the files of the Director of Research, MAI), p. 3.

²⁵Ibid.

The Vietnamese captain after awhile began to accept more suggestions, began to agree on points of tactics which he would not discuss a short time before. A little later he accepted completely his advisors and even accepted advice from the sergeants.²⁶

From the foregoing accounts we can begin to develop an appreciation of the scope and complexity of the numerous problem areas inherent in military advisor's mission. But why do we find our military advisors frequently facing such frustration, lack of cooperation, and hostility?

"A partial explanation is found in a statement made in a hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations in the United States Senate. ✓

They have the initiative in seeking and molding change: They introduced new products, new technical know-how, new political and military entanglements, new definitions of God, new attitudes toward men. The relationships required by these tasks are of the type more likely to divide men, than to bind them together.²⁷ "

Evidence indicates that there is considerable support for this rationale. Perhaps it is an occupational hazard of the military advisor to frequently encounter such unpleasant emotions and resistance to change. The following account tends to indicate that this may be the case.

In Calcutta they tell of a rich Bengali who was informed that a friend of his really hated him. "I don't understand why that man should hate me", he replied. "I have never helped him in my life." The overseas Americans are not so fortunate. The indictment that Americans are "impatient" and "superior" is directly related to the functions they perform in other peoples' countries.²⁸

²⁶ Student Field Report from Vietnam, Military Assistance Institute, Washington, D. C. (in the files of the Director of Research, MAI), p. 2.

²⁷ U. S. Congress Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, The American Overseas, 86th Congress, 1st Session, 1959, p. 16.

²⁸ Ibid.

Thus we find from the foregoing accounts that the MAAG Chief and his advisors must be prepared to face numerous problems. As Americans they are representative of their nation. They are representative of a way of life which we consider quite sound.²⁹ But cultural empathy is essential if the military advisor is to be successful. The military advisor must have the ability to understand an alien culture, to see the inner logic and the cohesion of the way in which people do things, and to reserve his judgment within that economic and ideological context.²⁹ The MAAG Chief must take positive action to insure that his subordinate advisors possess sensitivity and an awareness of the importance of their own personal traits and actions.

What kind of image or impression does the American military advisor make in the eyes of the people of the host country?

Lieutenant General S. T. Williams in discussing the importance of the advisor's personal conduct stated,

When you are on MAAG duty, particularly in an Asian country, you will be watched closely by the local people, civilians as well as military, including Communist agents who may be either male or female. I urge you never forget it. The Red agent will watch you to report on your daily activities and habits. He even may try to make your acquaintance or to get you involved in some illegal or immoral act -- all this to put you in a position for blackmail or even for assassination. These agents are clever, they are in a life and death struggle and will stop at nothing. You may never discover that they are Red agents and if you should discover it, the chances are it will be too late. The military will watch you to determine if they will accept or merely tolerate you. The run of the mill American, having heard of the high illiteracy rate in the Far East or backward countries, often underrates the people with whom he works. Don't fall into that error. There

²⁹Ibid., p. 19

are many very intelligent people in those backward countries, just as there are some backward people in our own country." Since you are an American officer, your counterpart expects you to be intelligent and expects you to be efficient. Frankly, if you are not more professionally qualified than he, why should you be detailed to him as an advisor?³⁰

As previously mentioned, the evidence compiled during the course of this endeavor indicates that all too often some American military advisors are either too naive or too unsophisticated in their dealings with foreign nationals.

In spite of the hints with which they are literally surrounded, many overseas Americans seem inclined to believe that their safest course is to be themselves, to stick to the simple straightforward friendliness which is so strong in our American upbringing. Supposedly, friendliness and honesty are what other peoples like best about Americans. Yet because of the thousands of nuances in personal relationships, development in some cultures over thousands of years of crowded living and preoccupation with "face," the Asian or African is less likely to applaud the American for his friendliness and honesty than to view him askance for his seeming lack of manners or lack of guile.³¹

Too many Americans do not seem to have the perceptiveness to realize that what they consider normal may be very irritating to others.

In an endeavor to determine the criteria for personal success in U. S. MAAG's and missions abroad a survey was made of over two hundred foreign military men ranking from major general to staff sergeant in foreign army, navy and air force services. The survey was conducted by senior officers of the U. S. Army, Navy, and Air Force.

"Again and again, it was impressive to note our Allies' identification of subtle nuances of interpersonal relations which defy reduction to quantitative evaluation, but which are essential to successful

³⁰Williams, 97.

³¹Cleveland, Mangone and Adams, 40.

Mission operations. It rapidly became evident that some of the key facets of successful Mission operations would not be reducible to check-lists but, instead, demand continuing perception by the U. S. Advisor, both while preparing for his assignment in the U. S. and, later, on the job in the foreign country. Also, it was clear that the Allied military man was asking that the U. S. military man be more than the all-around generalist or the technician who "adapts" to the local environment only after learning by "experience" and sometimes by tragic "trial and error".³²

The importance of professional competence was emphasized by the overriding requirement for skill in military affairs which cropped up in all discussions. The importance of "agreeability" can be exaggerated. One allied officer put it bluntly.

"If my U. S. counterpart can't offer something worth learning, the value of U. S. presence is nullified, no matter how pleasant or social he is."³³

The survey indicated that "the advisor who lacks professional competence and currency in his field has little impact. The Ally appreciates the U. S. military man who clearly knows what he is doing, and does it."³⁴

It was also determined that "for the Allied officer, professional competence is associated with rank at higher staff and command level. No matter how seemingly competent Mission personnel are in dealing with senior Allied commanders and staffs, they operate from a tremendous disadvantage, if they lack the rank or demonstrated background associated with commensurate assignments."³⁵

³²"Through Foreign Eyes", October 7, 1963, Memorandum from Maj Gen Lansdale (in the files of the Director of Research, Military Assistance Institute, Washington, D.C.), p. 3.

³³Ibid.

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Ibid., 4.

The question of the importance of language skill revealed that generally it cannot be overemphasized.

"Following professional competence, if any one requirement was identified by Allied personnel as of paramount importance for the successful advisor it was language skill or, more specifically, an ability to get thoughts across to host country counterparts. Both Officers and NCOs alike considered a language capability essential for U. S. personnel who are working with host country military on a day-to-day technical or operational basis. Many of the officers indicated that they would rather work with a competent U. S. officer who could communicate his knowledge rather than to an outstanding officer who was operationally inarticulate. They felt that an inability to speak the language denied them access to the doctrinal and technical knowledge that the U. S. officer had. The foreign NCOs considered the language capability as the most important single requisite for the advisor. The Officers qualified the language requisite to those U. S. personnel who deal day-to-day with their host country counterparts. They did not stress the language requirement for the Mission chiefs. Although language skills were stressed, there also were cautions about going overboard in this area. The mediocre or substandard U. S. officer who makes out because he speaks the language "like a native" apparently has been the bane of many a mission. The effort of the U. S. military man to make a real attempt to learn and to use the language of the host country is long remembered and appreciated. The level of language fluency achieved is not as important as the effort to learn and try. A North African Captain recalled how a U. S. officer worked night after night to learn Arabic and his genuine effort was known and appreciated throughout the host country's military.³⁶"

Accessibility was also identified as one of the most important criteria for the U. S. military advisor.

"Accessibility means to get out and see the troops as well as just being available. Among troop leaders, the point that the Mission officer gets out to see them ranks high. Furthermore, successful Mission operations require an ability to adjust schedules to the local situation. Host country military want access to the U. S. Mission. In some cases working hours do not follow

³⁶Ibid., 2.

U. S. patterns. For example, one Latin American officer stated that during the afternoon hours when coordination could best be effected, the U. S. Mission staff was taking language training.³⁷ "

As mentioned earlier empathy is a valuable personal asset to the successful advisor.

"Empathy, or to be "simpatico" in its true sense, as a point of importance, appeared to be a key consideration throughout the surveys. The officers in particular stressed the need for U. S. personnel to really want to be assigned to their country (a difficult criterion to implement). As an Asian officer put it: "If they don't like our country, then they shouldn't come." The deliberate effort of some U. S. personnel to isolate themselves physically from the indigenous environment was noted as a negative quality. It was pointed out by the officers that the language barrier isn't the cause of this isolation, but, instead, a deliberate lack of empathy and interest in the host country. Empathy is a two-sided coin. The Ally wants U. S. officers to know about the host country. However, when a U. S. military man comes up against other cultures, he needs an understanding of the toughness of his own heritage and the system under which he works. All agree that close personal and social ties make for best professional relations. Friendships and trust lead to acceptance as an advisor, but entree into foreign society is not always easy and the foreign officers recognize this. The absolute need for continuing cognizance of the human side of Mission work was summed up by another Asian officer who said: "I have read the Ugly American; and while you may not think it at all good, I think it should be required reading for all Mission people so they can better understand us."³⁸ "

The allied officers also considered it important that the advisor have a knowledge of the host country and show an interest in it.

"Nationalism and historical pride play active roles in the host country military outlook. The U. S. officer who appears deliberately ignorant or disinterested in the history of the host country puts himself at a tremendous disadvantage. The intense and, many times nonrational sensitivity of the foreign military man in this area of national pride must be faced up to by U. S. personnel, and the U. S. officer who takes visible interest in the

³⁷Ibid., 3.

³⁸Ibid.

history, both past and current, of the host country operates with a tremendous plus. A Latin American officer described the need for U. S. personnel to sense the intense nationalism of the Latin American and his sensitivity to U. S. dominance by stating: "You use the word American as if it were the personal possession of the United States. We know the U. S. is powerful, but please speak of your destiny with some modesty".³⁹

The importance of directness was mentioned by the survey officers. However, the relative importance of this criteria will vary in different parts of the world. As discussed previously, indirectness seems to be favored in many areas, particularly in Asia.

Often expressed as requirements for "frankness" and "directness", the feeling that U. S. Mission goals have been deliberately obscured in dealings with the host country cropped up in conversation with Allied officers. The need for U. S. personnel to appear "direct" or "straight" is evident, and is treated as a "delicate" point by Allies. The host military feels in some cases that they are not being given a straight cut and do not have access to all the rules of the game. In the words of a Middle East infantryman: "We are soldiers; tell us what you want as a soldier." The need for an appearance of frankness in discussion is of vital importance to the host military. "What do you want us to do and why?" and "What is the purpose of the query or request for reports?" are the questions asked by the Allies.⁴⁰

The American trait of demonstrable enthusiasm is highly valued by our allies.

The host country officer appreciates the "can do", positive approach of his U. S. counterpart and time after time "enthusiasm" combined with the appearance of genuine interest cropped up as requirements in discussions. The U. S. Officer who shares problems and successes, and who can genuinely say "our" effort when working with Allies can break down many of the barriers to effective communications.⁴¹

Adaptability, flexibility and skill in "the art of the impossible" were identified as much needed ingredients for success.

³⁹ Ibid., 5.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid.

"The U. S. Military man who is "locked in concrete" is quickly spotted by the Ally. The ability to see the whole picture and, if necessary, to adjust U. S. doctrine and technique to the indigenous military environment and the resources at hand is a must. To tailor the model to the environment rather than arbitrary attempts to recreate U. S. military models within stilted parameters is the object.⁴²"

One of the most important traits of an effective advisor is patience. The evidence collected during this research project tends to indicate that without patience, an advisor will soon lose his usefulness.

Although the Ally appreciates the sense of urgency, directness, and business-like approach associated with U. S. military personnel, respect for local culture patterns, that include varying degrees of formalism and indirection, is an identifiable requirement. To be able to appreciate the foreigners' culture, work within it, and still get the job done, is the trick. At the heart of this working from within is the need for patience. Foreign personnel are the first to recognize the oft-times exasperating situations created by U. S. personnel by language and culture barriers and, as a result, the Ally appreciates the man "who will explain again." The U. S. advisor who reflects "can do" optimism, a faith in people, combined with patience, a willingness to stick it out, has a real chance to get the work through.⁴³"

The importance of a sense of humor and self control was also stressed by the survey officers.

"The ability of U. S. personnel to recognize and share the humorous word or deed was identified. Conversely, the pompous, stilted U. S. military personality who lacks the imagination to share humor or who escapes into military posturing is likely to become a butt for derision. In contrast to the ability to share humor, public displays of ill temper by U. S. personnel can destroy all previous efforts to achieve rapport." A U. S. officer assigned to a foreign military school was cited as a case in point. The officer was refereeing a student volley ball game and, when challenged over a mistaken ruling, lost his temper. His highly emotional outburst in this single instance destroyed the rapport he had carefully nurtured with the student personnel over an extended period of time.⁴⁴

⁴²Ibid., 6.

⁴³Ibid.

⁴⁴Ibid.

In regard to politics the survey found that the allied officers and NCOs "were vehement in establishing the requirements that US personnel not meddle in the internal politics of the host country. However, the officers felt that prior orientation on politics was important, and the advisor who is totally oblivious to the political milieu in which he operates appears naive and disinterested to his host country counterpart. In contrast, the NCOs thought knowledge of politics had little significance, but instead stressed the importance of being 'technically qualified.'"⁴⁵

The U. S. military advisor who attempts to "meddle" in the internal politics of the host country, needless to say, would soon be discovered and his tour of duty or his usefulness terminated. Conversely as we have seen previously, the MAAG Chief and his subordinates have an important responsibility in keeping themselves well informed in regard to the local politics of the host country. In a hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations in the United States Senate it was stated:

We have already seen in Pakistan as we have seen in Iraq, the take-over of a government by military officers. We were in contact with these officers to help them learn how to use newfangled weapons, but we somehow were not effective in contact with them in a political way.⁴⁶

The survey concluded with a discussion of the length of tours for advisory personnel.

Two years is thought to be a minimum, at least in those cases where close personal relationships are

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, The American Overseas Hearings, 1959, p. 4.

important to effective working patterns. A Latin American officer summed up the need for length in tour. "It takes one year for a Mission man to find his way. The second year he begins to make a contribution, and it is not until his third year that he is achieving maximum value and we really get the most from him." Of particular interest was the NCO's opinion that US NCO personnel should be limited to two-year tours. They felt that they outstayed their usefulness beyond that period. A Latin American NCO put it frankly: "They just slow down." With regard to second tours, the officers indicated that they would have value if there was a two or three-year break - but of most significance, that there should be no second tour if there was a ten to twelve-year interval between assignments. The NCOs were against second tours. The NCOs expressed a concern about over-familiarity. As one stated in parable: "When a visitor first comes to your house, he sits straight in his chair and makes proper conversation. After many visits he doesn't bother to speak, but goes straight to your kitchen." In the opinion of the NCO personnel, the one-shot TDY team was believed to be acceptable, but not the best solution to passing on technical information if language skills are limited.⁴⁷

The remarks from senior MAAG officers tend to indicate that there is room for considerable improvement among U. S. military advisors. One senior MAAG officer stated,

Another thing that personnel coming over here are frequently lacking is the ability to be most circumspect in their personal lives. These people are very shy, sensitive and have quite moral standards. Some of our advisors in the past have been too loud mouthed, wear flamboyant clothes, drank too much publicly, appear over-bearing, and sometimes get involved with native girls.⁴⁸

There are indications that some U. S. military advisors have become so engrossed with technology and staff procedures that they need to go back and refresh themselves on the fundamentals of

⁴⁷"Through Foreign Eyes", Lansdale, p. 6.

⁴⁸"Notes from Senior MAAG Officers", MAI, Washington, D.C., p. 2.

soldiering. The following remarks from another senior MAAG officer illustrates a need for such training.

"Getting down to more specific points; since most of our people are in the field engaged intimately with training the armed forces, I find the greatest deficiency of our new advisors is lack of intimate knowledge in troop training. Every individual who comes over here ought to be up to date, either through practice or from study, with the provisions of FM 23-5, 7-10, and 7-20. The technical service officers who are engaged in logistics training should be familiar with supply procedures of their service. It has been my experience that colonels and lieutenant colonels and some majors have been so long away from troops that they have forgotten how to fire basic weapons, so we run a refresher course on them as soon as they get here. We are concentrating on marksmanship in this MAAG and they must know how to do it right.⁴⁹"

In The Overseas Americans the authors charge that the Armed Forces have shown an inability to prepare their personnel for fruitful personal contact with the foreign cultures.

As late as 1958 there was no systematic training of Military Advisory and Assistance Group Officers for overseas service. Today the MAAG's account for about 5,000 men and officers working in more than 35 countries. They are close to the military leaders of many foreign governments, advising them in training their security forces, and administering military equipment and supplies provided by the United States government as "assistance." In many countries MAAG's are closer to the center of political influence than any other American agency and in every country they have close contact with their native opposite-numbers in the military command. Yet more than half of the new Military Assistance Institute's program, which trains more than 100 MAAG officers with a staff of six full-time instructors and six part-time instructors, deals with the structure and procedures of the military aid program narrowly conceived.⁵⁰

At the present time there are indications that this allegation is still substantially correct. Only about fifty percent of MAAG

⁴⁹Ibid., pp. 1-2

⁵⁰Cleveland, Mangone and Adams, pp. 279-80.

officers are given the opportunity to attend the four-week course at the Military Assistance Institute.

As Americans abroad we are foreigners. Even our dress, speech and actions are strange to the local people. At times, unless we understand and observe local customs, we are offensive. In the majority of the countries of the world the ladies, although perhaps skimpily clad on the beaches and charmingly décolleté in the evening, do not do their daytime shopping in sunsuits and pincurlers -- nor do their husbands wear sports coats to evening social functions. In one South American country, it is illegal for a man to appear on the street in his shirt sleeves. American who live in that country find it difficult to understand that in some parts of the world a man's shirt is still considered to be an undergarment, and as such is definitely not proper attire for a shopping tour or for receiving guests in home or office.

Fortunately, not all Americans find it so difficult to adjust to foreign living. The majority show the same consideration for local customs and sensitivities that we expect from foreigners who visit our own country. Many are even ready and willing to sacrifice some physical comfort in exchange for the rich cultural advantages that are always available to those who are curious and interested. These are the Americans who will easily and surely master the fundamentals of overseas living. They will not only be happier than those who refuse, and richer in experience, but they will also be positive rather than negative factors in the shaping of foreign attitudes toward our nation and our objectives.⁵¹

⁵¹ Colonel Richard C. Harris, "Overseasmanship", (in the files of the Military Assistance Institute, Washington, D. C.), pp. 14-15

In this modern age of jet transportation "the term 'culture shock' is often loosely applied to cover all forms of adjustment overseas. But the very first shock is more intimately physical and sensory; it assails the nostrils, the ears, and the eyes. A family can leave New York by air and fifty hours later be on the other side of the world, suddenly turning the clock of civilization back several centuries as measured by American standards of wealth, sanitation practices, and population control."⁵²

The importance of the U. S. military advisor's family which has been mentioned only briefly heretofore, deserves some consideration. The "pretty Americans" can do much to assist their advisor husbands in a strange land.

Military personnel, and their families, assigned to military assistance advisory groups and similar missions in countries of the free world have significant capabilities, disproportionate to the relatively small size of units concerned, to promote understanding, cooperation, and kinship not only between their own personnel and the civilian population but also (through example, demonstration, and guidance) between the military forces and civilians of the host country. In many countries there is an unsatiated demand for education and development in various vocational and technical skills, and in every military unit and their associated families there are untapped reservoirs of knowledge and skills which can be channeled through voluntary efforts into programs of education and assistance. The very nature of the advisor's role - his daily and intimate contacts with host unit personnel, participating in their daily activities, sharing in their ceremonies, bringing them a better understanding of the United States, and showing a sincere interest in their language, culture, and welfare - goes far toward building bonds of mutual respect and loyalty.⁵³

⁵²Cleveland, Mangone and Adams, p. 47.

⁵³U. S. Department of the Army, Civil Affairs Operations, FM 41-10 (Washington: The Adjutant General's Office, 1962), p. 87.

Many American families find that their first and most difficult lesson in overseas duty is that of adjusting to strange living conditions.

Some unhappy families never do get over this first hurdle. For example, one otherwise charming Air Force wife -- who is typical of many that most of us have encountered in various overseas posts -- limited her interests to the confines of the commissary, the P. X., the American Officers' Club and the American movie theater. Repeated cautions about comparative standards of sanitation had made her afraid to take a chance on the famed cuisine of European restaurants. Paris, Rome and Madrid, to her, were merely dirty cities full of dirty foreigners. In her home she found herself thoroughly frustrated by the same sort of outdated plumbing fixtures and cooking devices that both her mother and her grandmother had coped with quite cheerfully. She was vexed by her servants and by the marketing system; and on top of all this there was the language barrier. She complained frequently and with feeling to her uncomprehending maids; and they too were unhappy. Her husband infected by the contagion, would escape to the office and let off steam within earshot of his "native son" clerks by making scathing remarks about the inefficiency of the local authorities. Both the maids and the clerks reacted just as any loyal American would react were the situations reversed -- they accepted the slurs and complaints of their foreign patrons as insults to their nation. Being unable to reply in kind (for fear of losing their jobs) only made the bitterness worse. And, as is so frequently the case, these indigenous employees formed the closest contact between this particular American family and the local community. As employees of the foreigners they were considered by the local populace to be experts on our manners and mores -- and they were only too anxious to spread the word. The otherwise charming Air Force wife, being unable to understand the apparent inhospitality of the local populace, attributed it to anti-Americanism. Nor was her husband ever able to understand why he was unable to get to first base with the inefficient local authorities.⁵⁴

Where does the MAAG Chief begin to look to insure that his advisors are competent, capable and successful? "The Draper Report found that "undeniably, the starting point for the American advisor is knowledge: (1) of the attitudes, aspirations, and pulse of the populace; (2) of the background, views, and motivations of the

⁵⁴Harris., pp. 13-14.

leadership; (3) of the extent of community of interest among government and people; and (4) of the temper of the political opposition and the major political issues involved. There must, of course also be basic knowledge of local traditions, religion, institutions, customs, and practices. Extensive personal contact with all strata of society is needed to provide such knowledge. This contact is collectively, a key role of the U. S. staffs abroad."⁵⁵ "

Major General Roy E. Lindquist, while Chief of MAAG in Iran, in an orientation talk to his officers and NCOs discussed how four basic elements of leadership have a direct bearing on the degree of success of MAAG operations. General Lindquist stated that success "will be in direct proportion to degree of effort we put into our job, tied with our degree of leadership, knowledge and experience upon which we base and execute our tasks."⁵⁶

In my earlier comments on detrimental indications which led me to talking to you today there were matters which apply directly to four basic elements of leadership and have a direct bearing on [the] degree of our success here in Iran. They are:

Character: Not only are we here to do a job within the bounds of our military mission, but all that we and our families do both on and off duty will reflect either credit or discredit on ourselves and our country. "Honesty ✓ tactfulness, sincerity, resourcefulness and courage, (both moral and physical), can all be related to measuring degree of character. The degree to which we possess these will determine whether we are our own best friend or our own worst enemy, and may I emphasize here that equally as important as physical courage is the necessity for possessing moral courage."

⁵⁵U. S. Supplement to the Composite Report of the President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program, Vol II (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 154.

⁵⁶Notes for Orientation Talk to Officers and NCO's, Teheran, Iran, by Maj Gen Roy E. Lindquist on January 13, 1959 (in the files of the Military Assistance Institute, Washington, D. C.), p. 3.

Temperance: "It is mandatory that we be temperate in all habits, careful of conduct and neat in appearance. Intemperance breeds weakness that in time will destroy all qualities of leadership. I refer not only to temperance in drinking, but in eating, talking, and all ordinary indulgences." A member of this Mission for example who neglects his sleep and rest will limit his capacity for the successful carrying out of his job assignment.

Loyalty: Loyalty is just as essential here in ARMISH/MAAG as it is in any military unit, or for that matter, in the field of business. When I speak of loyalty I am referring to loyalty to juniors as well as seniors. When any member of this mission encounters problems which affect his performance he must rely on the loyalty of his superior to help him solve his problem and go to him for help. The level to which the problem is sent for solution is dependent upon the magnitude of the problem, and I will assure everyone here that problems coming to my attention will be resolved; and if not at my level I will push through to higher levels. There is nothing more dangerous to the successful accomplishment of our ARMISH/MAAG Mission here in Iran than a state of low morale which can be corrected if taken to the proper level of authority through the normal chain of command.⁵⁷

General Lindquist observed that the advisor's "personal life must be so well conducted that it never becomes a matter of public discussions or attention. Closely allied with the comments I made pertaining to character requirements, I reiterate that our actions, words and manners will always be in the balance of both military and public opinion whether at home in our family or bachelor quarters, or in town or when traveling."⁵⁸

In conclusion General Lindquist stated, "With your complete and untiring efforts, enthusiastic response to the many challenging tasks, wholehearted cooperation, unselfish devotion to the job facing you,

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 4.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 5.

the maintenance of high standards, and the application of all basic requirements for good leadership, we will successfully contribute to the accomplishment of the tasks calling for our presence here in Iran and you and I will look back as former members on our contribution to ARMISH/MAAG activities with much pride."⁵⁹

The importance of adhering to these basic fundamentals of leadership was borne out also in the findings of the Draper Report.

"It is basic that the advisor demonstrate, by his own conduct, the very ideals and traits he seeks to encourage in others. Integrity and devotion to duty must be reflected in his every action. While conforming to local customs, the military adviser, for example, should meticulously observe the same rules and spirit practiced in his own service. He must display, on all inspections and visits, the same concern for the health, welfare and comfort of the troops and for objective standards of military justice as accords with the best traditions of the U. S. forces. These things rub off. There is evidence that the example of MAAG officers has often resulted in the absorption of practices which have strengthened local military esprit and cohesion."⁶⁰

To obtain additional comments and observations relative to the ingredients necessary for success in MAAG duties we turn again to Latin America. The name of the host country has been deleted for obvious reasons.

As Chief of the US Army Mission to _____, I am having considerable success, as also are my officers. Before my arrival they were frustrated and only moderately effective. Now they are enjoying high prestige in the eyes of the _____ Army, they are effective beyond their most optimistic hopes, enthusiastic and energetic in their jobs, and are enjoying a close working relationship with the _____ Army that encourages them to increased efforts. The older officers, who were previously frustrated and unhappy in their jobs, are sold

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 6.

⁶⁰U. S. Supplement to the Composite Report of the President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program. p. 155.

on my method of operation. " In the first place, as a Mission officer, you are in a peculiarly advantageous position in that you have something valuable to offer that your Host Army needs badly and that is competent, professional advice and "know-how". You must tell them so in such a way that they too will believe it. Then you must offer and present this advice and "know-how" in a positive, frank, constructive and competent manner like a professional soldier - just as you have been trained to do in your own Army. Next, you must be completely sincere in your desire to do everything in your power to help your Host Army, Navy or Air Force as the case may be. You must let them know that this is your mission and main reason for being in their country, that you will do your best for your "adopted" Army, that you will be loyal to it and to those with whom you work, and that you will do everything you can to make their Army a more competent and efficient military force. And you had better believe it and mean it! "

Not until you have gained their confidence can you really begin to work. How long will this take? It depends on several factors - most importantly the officer himself, then the existing relationship between the Mission and the Host Army, the Mission's method of operation, the political situation in some cases, the economic conditions of the country, etc. But by far the most important is the Mission Chief, who sets the example, policies and tempo for the entire Mission. In my case it took the short space of two months. But I also used a simple form of strategy, overlooked by most Mission Chiefs, to speed me on my way. This simple but all important strategem is the intelligent use of the officer Aide-de-Camp furnished the Mission Chief by the Host Army. This Aide-de-Camp is the Mission Chief's direct back-door channel of communication to the Army's high command. Include him in all your mission activities, conferences, and meetings, and make him feel that he is a trusted and valuable member of your team, which he is. Utilize every opportunity in your meetings and conferences, to expound your policies and ideas for your Host Army, voice your honest, constructive criticisms of deficiencies that you have observed and what you plan to do about them. "Praise your Host Army and its officers whenever you properly can and never criticise except when doing so constructively and following it up with a course of action or recommendation to correct the deficiency mentioned."

When you feel that you have a fairly solid measure of their confidence in your sincerity, professional competence and know-how, you are ready to request permission to visit

their units in the field. Refrain from giving advice until you have visited their units, especially those in the field and on outpost duty. "Curb your impatience to advise - you will have plenty of opportunity and time later to carry the ball. Go slowly at first. They will "test you for gas", but if you resist the temptation to give early advice, you will gain much stature in their eyes."

"Never miss an opportunity to impress the officers of your "adopted" Army with your leadership, drive, energy, loyalty, sincerity and professional competence. Let them know that you are a professional soldier just as they are. Never make a promise or a commitment that you can't or don't intend to carry out, and let them know that you expect the same treatment from them, as you are accustomed to dealing with professionals, not amateurs. Their pride is strong. They do not want to be thought amateurs and will work hard to earn your respect and admiration. But its a two way street - you will get no more in return than you give."

"Now you are ready to visit some units in the field and on outpost duty. Don't make this a mere orientation visit, but offer constructive suggestions and comments. But be sure that you are right. Be professional and impersonal. And use an interpreter no matter how good your command of the language. In this way you can avoid the niceties of direct conversation and the danger of saying the wrong thing. The interpreter is your buffer in this respect, without restricting your full range of expression of pleasure or displeasure. After several months, when your reputation is established you can more or less dispense with an interpreter 90% of the time, but not initially. Always render a report to the Commanding General on what you observed, your impressions, and your recommendations. It will increase your professional status in his eyes, and he will appreciate your frank and honest appraisal of what you saw."

"Don't try to do too much. Plan carefully what you expect to accomplish and bend your every effort to that end. Don't scatter your shots in too many areas as they will try to get you to do. Concentrate initially in areas where you can make easily discernible and significant improvement, such as sanitation, complete execution of orders and follow up inspections, use of check sheets in inspections and maintenance, training and maintenance. This will enhance your reputation."

"Don't spend any more time than necessary on the cocktail circuit where you won't make many points. You will

make your points visiting units in the field and in the outposts. It is far better to use your energy to set a good example by starting work a half hour before your host Army starts. This will make a real impression."

"You may do all the things I have suggested herein and still not be able to get your project off the ground, unless you do the one All Important thing. It is simple, but it is an absolute must if you are to be completely successful on Mission type duty. You must answer the question uppermost in the minds of the officers whom you are trying to convince: "What's in it for me?" If you do answer this question properly, you will be "off and running", and if you don't your project may never get off the ground. It's that simple."

"In conclusion,

1. Be sincere, straightforward, frank, loyal and professional.
2. Don't persuade, cajole, and "pussy-foot". These tactics may work for the diplomats, but they are not for the professional soldier who really has something valuable to offer.
3. Get out and visit units, and when you return, write up a factual report of your observations, good and bad, with recommendations, for the Commanding General - or your counterpart.
4. Pay your way with a professional performance. This more than anything will sell the United States, our Military Establishment, and our way of life. I know. It has already worked for me and my officers who have been surprised by the simplicity of it all after months of frustration under the pussy-footing technique.
5. Last, but most important of all, answer fully the questions in their minds "What's in it for me?" then nothing can stop you. Remember this--it is the key to your success on Mission-type duty.⁶¹ "

Now that we have examined some of the criteria for successful MAAG operations we must look at the qualitative aspects of the advisor

⁶¹"Advising Techniques", Letter to Brig Gen Harry C. Newton, USA (Ret), Director, Military Assistance Institute, Washington, D. C., October 28, 1959 (in the files of the Director of Research, MAI).

personnel problem. The requirement for high quality personnel is indicated clearly by the evidence collected. The mediocre or sub-standard officer or NCO can frequently cause far more damage in a MAAG assignment than he can in a conventional assignment. The Draper Report stressed the reasons for selecting high quality personnel for MAAG assignments in the following comment:

In training activities abroad, demonstration of the values which distinguish responsive and responsible leadership rests with all of the U. S. citizens working and living there. It has been observed many times that it is primarily at this operational level that sustained, effective communication between nations can take place, that compatibility of United States and recipient country aims and objectives can be ascertained, and that progress toward mutual objectives can be furthered and measured. It is of critical importance, therefore, that we utilize only our best representatives in such training. Selection processes and standards should be vigorous, overseas training duties should be heavily weighed in promotion consideration, and preassignment orientation should be as thorough as possible.⁶²

The MAAG Chief is confronted not only with the problems inherent in dealing with the host country officials he must consider the problem of morale among his own personnel. The Draper Report found that,

...the belief has been current among military officers that a MAAG assignment is not a step in career advancement. Furthermore, some MAAG assignments in the underdeveloped countries are regarded as hardship tours. In Saudi Arabia, for example, the tour is only 11 months. As a result, so it is frequently asserted, the MAAGs do not receive an adequate share of the able personnel available. Relatively few officers request MAAG assignments. Many enter into it with reluctance. MAAG officers rarely serve more than one tour of duty. The average officer assigned to the program can be expected to work at maximum efficiency for only part of his tour, for

so much time is taken up by adjustment, orientation and on-the-job training. These observations which are voiced by many military officers may be exaggerated. Nevertheless, they are uttered often and widely enough to warrant a closer look at the career management of MAP within the services.⁶³

To alleviate this reluctance to accept MAAG and mission type assignments the Draper Report recommended that:

Steps should be taken to insure that MAP receives its share of competent individuals. The following suggestions are made to this end: (1) Outstanding service in MAP should contribute toward advancement beyond certain grades in U. S. military services. (2) MAP minimum tours of 3 years should be established wherever practicable. (3) In addition to active-duty military personnel, other sources of competent manpower should be sought. Some military personnel who are ready to retire might be able to perform useful MAP service both in the United States and the field. Civilians could perform many MAP functions. (4) Improvements should be made in the existing MAP educational system to compensate for the deficiencies inherent in the rapid rotation of officers in and out of MAP. (U. S. personnel should be given a better understanding of the MAP and of the U. S. administrative apparatus. They should also be trained in at least one important MAP skill and receive adequate area and language training. An optimum MAP training program should avail itself fully of the most up-to-date language training that can be given in advance of MAAG assignments overseas, in order to cut down the language lead time. At the present, most MAAG officers spend at least half of their tour acclimating themselves. To improve the training system in this respect, a language school might be established within the Pentagon itself and other major military installations. Pay incentives for learning languages might be initiated and periodic proficiency tests required for continuation of extra pay.) (5) The facilities of the Military Assistance Institute should be expanded to permit all MAAG officers to attend the course of training before taking up their overseas assignments. (At present only about half of such officers attend.)⁶⁴

⁶³Ibid., p. 87.

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 59.

We have thus determined that the ability to influence foreign groups and individuals into deliberately preplanned channels of thought, action and reaction requires not only intelligence, empathy, a talent for human relations and a specialized knowledge of the particular foreign culture and customs involved, but in many cases also requires the ability to communicate forcefully and effectively in a foreign language. While it is highly desirable that influential people of other nations learn to communicate with us in our language, it is more desirable that we learn to communicate in theirs. But this poses special problems not only in the education and training of MAAG representatives but also in their selection and assignment. Many American officers have neither the aptitude nor the inclination to learn a foreign language. The MAAG Chief should encourage all of his advisors, if not already trained, to become proficient in the host country's language. This problem of receiving advisor personnel who are not language trained is a major one. Some of the disadvantages of having to rely exclusively on an interpreter is somewhat dangerous as we have seen previously. The importance of giving MAAG personnel more thorough training in all aspects of their duties is apparent. The Draper Report contended that:

" The MAAG officer deserves training comparable with that of a military attache, who undergoes about a year of formal training before he assumes his duties. The attache's educational program includes language, area study, and intelligence techniques. Admittedly, the duties of the attache are not similar to those of the MAAG officer. Both however, are in daily contact with nationals of the host country, and it is important that both should have a knowledge of the indigenous culture and a basic understanding of the host country's economic and political as well as military problems. ✓

The task of the MAAG officer often proves more difficult than that of his diplomatic counterpart, and his responsibility for furthering the national interests of the United States may actually be greater. The little formal training which he received in comparison with the attache is illogical and tends to hinder him in the proper exercise of his functions. This is not to suggest that the MAAG officer should receive the same type of training as the attache, whose mission concentrates on the intelligence function. But the analogy serves to illustrate the need for a more intensive training which will prepare the MAAG officer for the performance of his mission.⁶⁵

The Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry in a report on psychological attitudes and adaptation in new situations determined that:

. . .certainly those individuals who have acquired a degree of awareness of their own culture background and habits, some information about the culture in which they are going to live, together with an appreciation of the meanings of cultural differences, seem to fare much better than those who did not get such preparations.⁶⁶

Whether or not the advisor receives formal preparatory training, it is imperative that all potential advisors use their own initiative in preparing themselves for their MAAG or mission assignment. The following list of pointers was prepared in one country as a means of stimulating potential advisors to examine their attitudes, guide themselves in the host country and thereby have a more meaningful and profitable relationship with the host population.

Expect some hardship at first, because of the shock of coming into the new culture. You will be under some strain, and so will the people who are receiving you.

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 88.

⁶⁶ Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, Working Abroad: A Discussion of Psychological Attitudes and Adaptation in New Situations, Report No 41. (New York: Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, 1958), p. 503.

Learn about the people by letting them tell you about themselves. Although you have heard something about them, you know less than you think you do. Don't be afraid to ask them questions; they will appreciate your interest. Expect that they will ask you lots of questions too. It may be uncomfortable to answer some of them.

Be prepared to appreciate and admire what they already are and do, as well as being prepared to give something worthwhile to them. Participate in unfamiliar customs, if you can. It is natural to be prejudiced against some of them, just as it is natural for them to be prejudiced against some of your customs. You may find your prejudices decreasing and theirs too.

Expect criticism. It will come from them, just as you will find yourself being critical after a while. But take it, think about it, it may be worth something to you.

Try to discover how they see you, in what social position, how they expect you to behave, what it will mean to them if you do not. Try to decide how you may strike a balance for yourself between what you are used to doing and what they will expect from you. Try to find a person in the community who can help you solve conflicts of this kind; there usually is at least one. Try to put into words what puzzles you about the new community, and share your concerns with him. He may be of great help.

Examine your own motives toward these people. How strong is your desire to "change" them? How would you feel if an outsider came in with the avowed purpose of "changing" you? What bad results might you fear if "change" were successfully brought about? Under what conditions might you accept an outsider's help? What conditions or limitations would you want to set for him? How would you want him to work along with you? You personally and your work will get on much better as long as you try to see things from the local population's point of view as well as your own.⁶⁷

In conclusion the MAAG Chief, must exercise decisive leadership to successfully cope with the problems inherent in his United States military advisory duties. Through the MAAG Chief's leadership the advisor can attain the ability to adjust to overseas living conditions

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 516-517

and to foreign cultures and customs without losing his identity and dignity as a representative of the United States. The advisor must attain a sufficient knowledge and understanding of foreign cultures and customs to permit him to avoid being unknowingly or unintentionally offensive. Through the MAAG Chief's guidance the advisor must develop the empathy, understanding and skill in human relations required to influence foreign groups or individuals into desired channels of thought.

America's position of world leadership implies many grave responsibilities. We are not running a popularity contest. But neither can we stop communist ideological encroachment with a stick. Leadership by threat and by force, while seldom difficult, is never entirely successful. Real leadership implies a great amount of understanding on the part of the MAAG Chief and a considerable amount of respect and trust on the part of the advisors who must follow. It is this sort of leadership which the MAAG Chiefs must provide if we are to win the cold war and preserve the institutions we cherish. It is this sort of leadership that we expect from every MAAG advisor assigned to a position of special responsibility and authority. All MAAG personnel can and must contribute more effective leadership if we are to attain the successful achievement of our national objectives.

Therefore, the MAAG Chief and his advisors would do well to reflect upon the following comment from the Draper Report:

The record is witness to the tremendous influence of a few dedicated Americans. The value of their efforts both to the country concerned and to the United States, has been inestimable. It is regrettable, however, that these initiatives, have not been more numerous. . . .⁶⁸

⁶⁸U. S. Supplement to the Composite Report of the President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program, p. 155.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Since World War II the Communist drive for world domination has necessitated the development of our present system of global alliances. Out of these mutual security alliances came the need for, and the development of, our present military assistance programs. Initially, the United States met the Communist challenge by furnishing military assistance to five countries on an ad hoc basis. This generous military and economic assistance was largely responsible for the decisive defeat of the HUK guerrillas in the Phillipines.

The United States again responded to the Soviet threat with an effective program of assistance in Greece and Turkey which prevented the capitulation of Greece and preserved the security of Turkey. In China, American military aid was granted largely for purposes other than to defeat the Communists through use of arms. As a result, the assistance effort was unsuccessful. In order to achieve peace in China, the United States decided to reduce its military assistance. The timing for this decision was unfortunate as it permitted the Communists to build up their own forces and subsequently defeat the forces supported by the United States.

The largest of the postwar assistance programs developed in Korea as a direct result of the North Korean Communists invasion

across the 38th Parallel in 1950. The Korean Military Advisory Group provided invaluable assistance to Republic of Korea forces during this conflict. KMAG is still engaged in this vital task and will continue to assist the ROK forces for many years to come.

In Iran, Soviet ambitions were also thwarted by American military assistance during the crucial postwar years. Despite Soviet protests and threats, American military advisory personnel have remained in Iran and are today giving assistance to this strategically located free world ally.

These assistance programs lacked effective coordination of effort but expanded with the passage of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949. Today the large number of military personnel engaged in military advisory duties abroad represents a powerful force for influencing the minds and attitudes of people throughout the world.

Functions of the MAAG Chief

Chapter II described the MAAG Chief's duties and functions as contained in Department of Defense Directive Number 5132.3 of July 8, 1963. The responsibilities of the Unified Command, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Secretaries and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) were also enumerated to give a better understanding of their relationship to the Military Assistance Program and the MAAG Chief. The military chain of command outlined by the DOD directive poses no unusual problems for the MAAG Chief. In fact, this clear delineation of

the Defense Department's policy enhances the command relationship between the MAAG Chief and his superiors.

The Country Team

An analysis of the duties and functions of the ambassador and the country team reveals that the ambassador has a tremendous amount of influence in the host country. He is the President's personal representative; as such he has the full responsibility and the necessary authority commensurate with the staggering task he has been assigned to accomplish.

The need for an organization to coordinate U. S. agencies in the host country resulted in the formation of a team of U. S. representatives under the leadership of the ambassador. This informal organization, known as the "country team," provides a means for all of the U. S. agencies to exchange information and viewpoints; a place for resolution of differences or misunderstandings; and an assembly where the ambassador may concur in positions and policies that affect the U. S. interests in that particular country.

It is interesting to reflect that the MAAG Chief, while under the U. S. Ambassador's general direction and leadership, has the right to non-concur in recommendations or proposals which he feels are wrong. In this connection, the MAAG Chief should keep a detailed record of all proceedings to insure against future misunderstandings.

In conclusion, the MAAG Chief has an important responsibility to assist the U. S. Ambassador in accomplishing his mission.

Conversely, it was also determined that the MAAG Chief has responsibilities to his military superiors. In this regard, the MAAG Chief must never compromise U. S. military standards of ethics to appease any official. The MAAG Chief and the ambassador can, through mutual cooperation, be of great assistance to each other in achieving U. S. aims in the host country. Further, all available evidence indicates that the ambassador's role as the senior American official, and leader of the country team, in the host country has been accepted by the MAAG Chiefs.

Strategic Role of the MAAG Chief

One of the tasks of the country team is the identification of potential leaders of emerging nations. The development and orientation of existing and potential leaders of emerging nations was found to be one of the principal leadership problems confronting MAAG Chiefs today. A chapter analysis was made of the key role which the military seems to have played in the development of the countries of Latin America, Africa and Asia. As a result of this analysis, it is apparent that the military of these nations played a key development role in the past. Today, they appear to assume an even more dominant role in numerous countries. The relationship which exists between the MAAG personnel and their counterparts in the host country's army is therefore of critical importance in this respect.

It was also determined that military advisory personnel appear to have the most contact with this military "elite" and thus

have the basis for the closest relationship. Through his association with the host country military, the MAAG Chief has an excellent opportunity to create the appropriate sets of attitudes and values in the military leaders of the developing nations.

The question was asked in an earlier chapter if the MAAG Chiefs are aware of their "strategic" leadership responsibilities. We found that there are indications that some are not aware of these responsibilities. However, it is hoped that this analysis and others like it will provide an awareness of the importance of the military in developing nations. In this manner the important leadership role of the MAAG Chief can be emphasized. The MAAG Chief must not only be aware of this problem but he must insure that his subordinates are also aware of their responsibilities in this field. The MAAG Chief can do much to achieve a close relationship with the host country military which will facilitate their own national development and at the same time achieve U. S. national objectives.

The Military Advisor

An analysis was made of the human relations problems encountered by the military advisors. Considering the numerous obstacles inherent in the military advisory mission, the question of how to achieve success was examined. The evidence indicated that the MAAG Chief must be an outstanding leader. Many advisors experience problems of apathy, indifference, hostility, and lack of cooperation as concerns the indigenous population. The importance

of the oriental preoccupation with "face" and the reluctance to admit lack of understanding was found to be a major consideration in Asia. The need to develop a helpful rather than completely critical attitude was emphasized by the evidence collected.

" The functions and tasks which the advisors are required to perform are often of the type more likely to alienate people than to win friends. This point indicated a strong requirement for the advisor to develop a close working relationship - a rapport - with his counterpart. It was found that the subtle nuances of interpersonal relations are essential to successful MAAG operations."

" This analysis also revealed that the advisors must know the people, the culture, the history, the language and the political milieu of the country in which they operate. Patience, a sense of humor, enthusiasm, flexibility and versatility were identified as important traits of an effective advisor."

" In the eyes of the foreigner, professional competence and the importance of language skill cannot be over emphasized. The evidence also indicated that there is a definite requirement for a working knowledge of local etiquette and social customs. There is no room in the MAAG for the proverbial "bull-in-the china-closet." One loud mouthed, overbearing military advisor can undo years of hard work. In this regard one former MAAG Chief stressed the importance of temperance. He indicated that intemperance breeds weakness which in time will destroy all qualities of leadership."

The conclusions derived from this endeavor are readily apparent. The recommendations of the Draper Report are still valid.

They should be implemented. "All MAAG Officers should receive sufficient formal training to enable them to cope with the formidable problems which await them. Top quality, highly motivated professionally qualified officers should be selected for MAAG assignments. There is still much room for qualitative improvement in this area.

"It is strongly recommended that all MAAG advisors attend the four-week course at the Military Assistance Institute, Washington D. C. In addition at least half of these same officers should receive further formal training to prepare them properly for their advisor duties. This additional training should be comparable to that received by the military attache."

"The importance of language training dictates that all advisory personnel should receive at least a six-week language familiarization course. Some selected officers should receive from six months to one year of language training."

It has been determined that the MAAG Chief must exercise decisive leadership if he is to accomplish his mission successfully. He must properly motivate his advisors. He must give them encouragement when the going is rough. He must set the example. Praise should be given freely when earned. Criticism should be delivered in privacy.

"The MAAG Chief should not depend on his advisors being trained when they arrive for duty. He should set up his own orientation program to insure that his advisors are positively aware of the "do's and don'ts" for his particular country. The requirement for intelligence, empathy, human relations skill, and specialized

knowledge of the foreign culture involved will be fulfilled only if the MAAG Chief takes the necessary steps to insure it."

The MAAG Chief should encourage his officers to participate in language training by making facilities, equipment and instructors available. The Draper Report recommended that pay incentives for learning languages might be initiated and periodic proficiency tests required for continuation of extra pay. The Department of Defense should also re-examine this recommendation and implement it if possible.

In conclusion, the volume of material collected indicates that if the global military advisory tasks at hand are to be accomplished there must be a feeling of urgency and "missionary zeal."

The successful accomplishment of the MAAG Chiefs mission is of paramount importance in deterring Communist aggression in the present day cold war struggle. It is imperative that all personnel concerned exercise their initiative to the utmost and contribute zealous, inspired leadership if success is to be achieved in the MAAG and mission assignments.

One may logically assume that the Communists will continue to use limited wars as a means of attaining world domination for the foreseeable future. This assumption which appears to be valid indicates that the United States will continue to support the present system of MAAG's and military assistance missions as they exist today. If this is the case, then immediate action must be taken to insure that military assistance advisory operations become more efficient and effective.

While spending millions of dollars on military assistance, the United States continues to send mediocre officers who lack motivation, initiative and competence to demanding MAAG and mission assignments.

In addition to the problem of low quality personnel, the training provided varies from barely adequate to none at all.

Even some senior MAAG officers appear not to understand the full scope of their responsibilities. Some are concerned only with the narrow aspect of military training. They have received in some cases only a few hours of orientation on their impending assignment and the attendant ramifications.

The poor results which we sometimes achieve are not surprising when we consider the problems which need to be solved in the military assistance advisory field.

The solution to the problem is the responsibility of the Department of Defense. To achieve the desired results, incentives must be furnished to encourage competent officers to volunteer for MAAG and mission assignments. Thorough and pertinent training programs must be set up to insure that all MAAG personnel are adequately prepared for their assignments. The MAAG Chiefs must cull out those individuals who cannot or will not perform their duties in an effective and efficient manner. In short, the military assistance advisory program needs to be revamped with higher standards, better personnel, appealing incentives and last, but not least, a quickened pace and a new sense of urgency.

APPENDIX

TERMS OF REFERENCE
FOR THE
MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP¹

1. These Terms of Reference govern the organization and operations of the Military Assistance Advisory Group, hereinafter referred to as the MAAG.

2. Mission.

[The mission of each MAAG will be issued by the respective Commander of the Unified Command after approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Assistant Secretary of Defense. (ISA)]

3. Command Relationships, Organization and Support.

a. The Chief of the MAAG commands the MAAG. During the absence of the Chief, the next senior officer assigned to the MAAG and eligible to command under regulations of his own Service will act as Chief of the MAAG.

b. The MAAG will consist of such organizational elements as the MAAG Chief might recommend and have approved by proper authority.

c. The senior Army, Navy or Air Force officer, assigned and eligible to command under regulations of his own Service, will be the Chief of his respective Service's Section, except that the Chief and Deputy Chief, if one is authorized, of the MAAG will not also be the Chief of a Service Section.

d. With respect to administrative, technical and other non-policy matters primarily of interest to his Service, the Chief of a Service Section in the MAAG may receive instructions from, and is authorized to communicate with, his Military Department and its agencies. The Commander of the Unified Command and the Chief of the MAAG will be kept informed, as appropriate.

e. Administrative and logistical support of the MAAG normally will be provided by the host government in accordance with the bilateral agreement or by the U.S. Embassy in the host country. Air-lift support will be furnished for administrative use for the MAAG as a whole by aircraft assigned or made available to MAAG Service Sections. Flying hour cost for this purpose will be reimbursed by military assistance funds.

¹
U. S., Department of Defense, Department of Defense Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Military Assistance, Department of Defense Directive No. 5132.3, July 8, 1963, pp. 18-19.

f. Actions and recommendations concerning budgeting, funding and manpower requirements of the MAAG will be routed as provided in the Military Assistance Manual.

4. Responsibilities and Functions.

a. The responsibilities and functions of the MAAG are set forth in Section IV G of DoD Directive 5132.3, July 8, 1963.

b. No classified U.S. military information of any nature, the release authority for which is not contained in appropriate directives, will be released to host government representatives without approval of the Commander of the Unified Command. In the event country authorities request military advice or information of a strategic nature from the MAAG, such requests will be referred to the Commander of the Unified Command. U.S. war plans will not be divulged to foreign nationals without the specific authority of the Commander of the Unified Command. The Commander of the Unified Command will be advised by the Chief of the MAAG of any action taken by host government authorities as a result of receiving strategic advice from the U.S. or from any other source, if such is known. The Commander of the Unified Command will, in turn, keep the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised as appropriate.

5. Special Instructions.

Deviations from the format and content of the above paragraphs are authorized, as necessary to conform to missions assigned to world-wide MAAG's and Missions.

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